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ABSTRACT 
 
Social finance is fast becoming a mainstream source of funding for 
goods and services that target poor people across the globe. With social 
finance, impact investors put their capital behind enterprises that profitably 
cater to underserved populations by expanding access to critical goods and 
services, such as healthcare, affordable housing, credit, and quality 
employment.  Social finance is hybrid in that it is driven by both social and 
commercial imperatives:  Impact investors and social businesses want to 
generate financial returns alongside a positive social impact.  While 
hybridity creates pathways for changing the role of business in society, it 
also creates openings for explosive conflicts of interest that can harm the 
very people whose lives are supposed to be improved.  This article argues 
that social-financial hybridity presents a pressing regulatory challenge that 
must be addressed.  It evaluates the potential for three newly established 
Social Stock Exchanges (SSEs)—platforms designed to connect investors 
with social businesses in need of capital—to bridge this regulatory gap.  
Treating SSEs as transnational rulemaking laboratories for social finance, 
this study reveals how current regulatory frameworks fall short of filling 
the hybridity cracks through which beneficiaries can slip and recommends 
measures for correcting this deficit.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
                                
Social finance makes a compelling promise:  to make the world 
a better place by harnessing the power of the market to address 
pressing global social challenges—to do well financially by doing 
social good.  In order to fulfill this promise, however, social 
finance—or impact investing—must strike a delicate balance 
between two historically opposed imperatives:  profit and social 
benefit.  And when this balance tips in favor of profitability, social 
finance can end up harming the very people whose lives it seeks to 
improve. 
Because it operates at the intersection of commerce and 
philanthropy, social finance is hybrid in that it does not fall neatly 
under existing regimes for regulating charities, securities, or 
corporations.  This article proceeds by identifying hybridity as a 
significant regulatory challenge that must be addressed in order to 
ensure that social finance keeps its social promises.  It makes the case 
for regulating social finance and recommends that regulation be 
designed with an eye to maintaining a healthy balance between 
social and financial objectives and, crucially, to protecting the 
interests of the ultimate beneficiaries.  It then assesses the potential 
for social stock exchanges (“SSEs”) to bring this regulatory project 
to fruition.  
With social finance, impact investors put their capital behind 
ventures (known as “social businesses”) that profitably cater to 
underserved populations.  These businesses provide access to 
critical goods and services, such as financial services, healthcare, 
affordable housing and quality employment to the economically 
and socially disadvantaged—people excluded from ordinary 
markets because conventional businesses view them as being too 
costly or risky to service or employ. 
In a world of diminishing public funding for addressing social 
problems, governments and international organizations are 
evermore eager to put private investment to work in the social 
sphere.  In a strong expression of support for social finance, British 
Prime Minister Cameron launched the 2013 G8 Social Impact 
Investment Forum, saying:  
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We’ve got a great idea here that can really transform our 
societies by using the power of finance to tackle the most 
difficult social problems that we face.  Problems that have 
frustrated government after government, country after 
country, generation after generation. . . .  The potential for 
social investment, I think, is really that big.1  
Buoyed by the enthusiastic backing of both public and private 
sector actors, social finance is fast becoming a mainstream source of 
funding for goods and services that target the global poor.  Studies 
produced by entities such as the World Economic Forum, JP 
Morgan, and Credit Suisse indicate that anywhere between $500 
billion and $1 trillion could be channeled into impact investments 
by 2020.2  To put these figures in perspective, consider that even at 
the lower end of this range, impact investments would surpass 
Official Development Assistance—the prevailing measure of public 
funding to developing countries—by a factor of four.3  Since about 
70% of impact investments are currently being deployed in 
emerging markets, the financial volumes at stake are potentially 
quite transformative.4   
Social finance seeks to remedy problems that are caused or 
aggravated by market exclusion while exploiting the tremendous 
market opportunities that exist at the “base of the pyramid” 
(“BoP”).5  So far so good.  However, the pursuit of hybrid returns—
financial and social—on investment creates openings for conflicts of 
interest that, if left unchecked, can harm the intended beneficiaries.  
The latter are characterized by acute financial and non-financial 
                                                     
1 David Cameron, U.K. Prime Minister, Opening Speech at the G8 Social 
Impact Investment Forum on Social Investment as a Force for Social Change (June 
6, 2013) [hereinafter Cameron Speech]. 
2 WORLD ECON. FORUM, FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM: ASSESSMENT OF 
THE IMPACT INVESTMENT SECTOR AND OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE MAINSTREAM 
INVESTORS 5 (2013), [hereinafter WEF REPORT], http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ 
WEF_II_FromMarginsMainstream_Report_2013.pdf.  
3 Aid to Poor Countries Slips Further As Governments Tighten Budgets, OECD 
(Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfur-     
therasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm. 
4 J.P. MORGAN & GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, SPOTLIGHT ON THE 
MARKET: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY 5 (2014), http://www.thegiin.org/binary-
data/ 2014MarketSpotlight.PDF. 
5 ALLEN HAMMOND ET. AL., WORLD RESOURCES INST., THE NEXT 4 BILLION: 
MARKET SIZE AND BUSINESS STRATEGY AT THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID 3 (2007), 
[hereinafter NEXT 4 BILLION], http://www.wri.org/publication/the-next-4-billion. 
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vulnerability.  They, too, live at the intersection of commerce and 
philanthropy.  With the limitations of public and philanthropic 
funding becoming more apparent, particularly in the wake of the 
global financial crisis, these individuals become evermore 
dependent on the market for meeting their basic needs.  This 
dependency in turn creates new vulnerabilities at the BoP.  
The history of microfinance (one branch of social finance) in 
India has taught us that under-regulated hybridity can have 
catastrophic consequences.  Microfinance Institutions (“MFIs”) are 
founded on a strong social mission—to improve the livelihoods of 
the poor by making credit available to individuals who are 
considered ineligible for conventional financing because they lack 
credit history and collateral to secure the loan.  But MFIs also 
advance a strong financial mission in the sense that the credit they 
make available is not free:  Micro-borrowers, typically poor women, 
must repay the loans, often at a high rate of interest.  This 
combination of social and financial objectives within a single 
business exemplifies the hybridity feature of social finance.   
In recent years, many successful MFIs have seen their financing 
evolve from being grant-based and sourced from philanthropic 
foundations, to equity-based and sourced from commercial 
investors.  Under increased commercial pressure, some MFIs in the 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh prioritized expanded growth targets 
over social impact, effectively departing from their social mission.  
In a pattern reminiscent of the sub-prime crisis in the United States, 
MFI “lenders to the poor” became embroiled in aggressive over-
lending and debt collection practices that culminated in a wave of 
borrower suicides in 2010.6     
This tragic story embodies an extreme instance of mission drift, 
whereby an entity strays from its social mission and prioritizes 
“profits to the detriment of the social good.”7  However, the risk that 
less dramatic versions of mission drift will undermine the promise 
of social finance is endemic and must be mitigated.  The influence of 
(existing and potential) investors on businesses that service the poor 
                                                     
6 HARVEY KOH ET AL., BEYOND THE PIONEER: GETTING INCLUSIVE INDUSTRIES TO 
SCALE 72 (2014), http://www.beyondthepioneer.org/wp-content/themes/     
monitor/Beyond-the-Pioneer-Report.pdf [hereinafter BEYOND THE PIONEER]. 
7 Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOCIAL INNOVATION 
REV. 52 (2012) [hereinafter Hybrid Ideal], http://ssir.org/articles/entry/in_ search_ 
of_the_hybrid_ideal?utm_content=bufferbf4c7&utm_medium=social&utm_ 
source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
  
146 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:1 
 
requires particular vigilance.  It is precisely when social businesses 
become successful enough to attract commercial investment that 
mission drift can create cracks in the social goods supply chain 
through which beneficiaries can slip.   
The challenge for regulators is therefore to ensure that impact 
investors and social businesses remain firmly committed to the 
social mission of their enterprise.  Such commitment must be 
resilient in the face of pressure to prioritize profit over impact or to 
undermine the “double bottom line.”8  Yet today, the investors and 
businesses operating within the social finance space are generally 
under-regulated.   
Enter SSEs—new platforms designed to connect “businesses that 
deliver social and environmental value with investors seeking both 
a social and a financial return.”9  Businesses looking to diversify 
their financing and scale up operations can “list” on SSEs and 
transact with investors seeking some combination of financial 
returns and positive social impact.  Like conventional stock 
exchanges (“CSEs”), such as the New York Stock Exchange or the 
London Stock Exchange, SSEs serve a regulatory function by 
requiring listed entities to comply with a number of rules and 
requirements in order to be and stay listed.  For example, listed 
social businesses must produce (at least) annual reports that disclose 
their performance; however, unlike CSEs, SSEs require that these 
reports contain information about social, as well as financial 
performance.   
No fewer than three SSEs were established in 2013:  The U.K. 
Social Stock Exchange (“SSX”), Canada’s Social Venture Connection 
(“SVX”), and the Singapore-based Impact Exchange (“IX”), which is 
a platform of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius.  Although they are 
still young, SSEs are actively working to fill the regulatory vacuum 
in which social finance currently operates.  Just as CSEs did for 
conventional finance centuries ago, SSEs today serve as 
“transnational rulemaking laboratories” for social finance.  They 
develop and test tools for distinguishing social businesses and 
impact investors from their conventional counterparts, establish 
procedures for standardizing social finance transactions, and shape 
                                                     
8 Lori Kozlowski, Impact Investing: The Power of Two Bottom Lines, FORBES  (Oct. 
2, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorikozlowski/2012/10/02/impactinvesting-the-
power-of-two-bottom-lines/. 
9 Cameron Speech, supra note 1. 
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the relationships between key stakeholders—investors, issuer-
businesses, and beneficiaries.   
It is important to track how, and how well, SSEs are carrying out 
these experiments, since this work could determine the content of 
social finance regulation for years to come.  Accordingly, this article 
reviews each SSE and assesses how effective it is in bringing 
regulatory order to social finance.  It finds that so far, all are wanting.   
To protect the promise of social finance, SSEs must protect the 
interests of beneficiaries and those of investors.  However, SSEs rely 
too heavily on the blueprint set by CSEs, which prioritizes investors 
over investment-affected individuals and communities.  This 
approach obscures the interests of beneficiaries, and therefore 
constitutes a dangerous foundation for social finance regulation.   
To correct this deficit, I recommend injecting strong beneficiary-
protections into each dimension of the SSEs’ regulatory framework, 
including mission statements, listing and corporate governance 
requirements, reporting requirements, and enforcement 
mechanisms.  For example, SSEs should require issuers to report not 
only on financial and social performance metrics, but also on the 
substantive feedback from beneficiaries.  Issuers should also be 
required to have a Social Director whose job is to ensure compliance 
with the social mission and to link beneficiaries to management.  To 
minimize commercial pressures to drift, investors must themselves 
be “patient” and committed to their investees’ social mission.10  SSEs 
should therefore screen investors before granting platform access 
and require them to subscribe to a patient investor code of conduct.  
Investment exits should also be managed by requiring that impact 
securities be on-sold only to other (screened) impact investors.  
This article proceeds in five Parts:  Part I provides a primer on 
social finance, explaining how it works and introducing the key 
stakeholders—impact investors, social businesses, and the 
beneficiaries.  It sets out a typology of beneficiaries to clarify some 
of the interests and vulnerabilities at stake.  Part II identifies the 
regulatory challenge created by social-financial hybridity, in 
particular in the case of commercially successful social businesses, 
and underscores the importance of regulating against mission drift.  
                                                     
10 See What Is Patient Capital?, ACUMEN FUND (last visited Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://acumen.org/ideas/patient-capital/ (explaining that patient capital is “a 
form of investment that has a high tolerance for risk, has long time horizons, is 
flexible to meet the needs of entrepreneurs, and is unwilling to sacrifice the needs 
of end customers for the sake of shareholders”) [hereinafter ACUMEN FUND]. 
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Part III sets the stage for understanding the role that SSEs can play 
in bringing regulatory order to the social finance space.  It highlights 
the limitations of importing the CSE approach to regulation into the 
SSE context because that approach fails adequately to protect 
beneficiaries.  Part IV describes the three SSEs and identifies the 
strengths and weaknesses of each model.  Part V offers an overall 
assessment of SSEs’ regulatory performance to date and makes 
concrete recommendations for improvement, with a particular 
emphasis on beneficiary protection.   
 
2.  SOCIAL FINANCE:  A PRIMER 
 
This Part lays the foundation for understanding the regulatory 
challenge that hybridity brings to bear.  It explains what social 
finance is and introduces the main stakeholders—impact  investors, 
social businesses, and the beneficiaries.  By drawing attention to the 
diversity among impact investors and social businesses, in 
particular their varying commitment to achieving both social and 
financial objectives, this Part shows how social-financial hybridity 
creates openings for serious conflicts of interest.  It offers a typology 
of beneficiaries in order to better understand the relationships 
between these individuals and the social businesses with which they 
transact.  The typology further serves to clarify how harm can ensue 
if beneficiary-social business relationships devolve as a result of 
mission drift. 
 
2.1.  What Is Social Finance? 
 
The pursuit of double or triple bottom line returns on 
investment—financial, social, and environmental—is alternatingly 
referred to as social finance, impact investing, or shared value 
investing, and I use these terms interchangeably.  One way to 
understand social finance is as an alternative mode of financing for 
socially beneficial goods and services that have traditionally fallen 
within the purview of government.  It involves bringing private 
capital and market-based business solutions to bear on the world’s 
most pressing social and environmental problems.  This article 
focuses primarily on the social (or human) rather than the 
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environmental category of problems, because, as argued below, that 
is where the regulatory framework for governing social finance is 
most lacking. 
Social finance has gained a lot of traction in recent years, rising 
in prominence among the business, philanthropic, and development 
communities, as well as among domestic and international policy 
makers.  It has captured imaginations in part because of the volumes 
of capital involved.  Since the term impact investing was coined in 
2007, we have witnessed increasing amounts of funds being 
channeled into social finance,11 and many predict that these 
problem-solving capital flows will exceed Official Development 
Assistance (“ODA”) by 2020.12  While the money alone is a sufficient 
reason to take social finance seriously, the ideas that fuel social 
finance may constitute an even more important reason to pay 
attention.  These ideas have the potential to change how and which 
socially beneficial services and goods (e.g. housing, health, 
education, and electricity) are financed, and therefore to transform 
global social provisioning systems.  This demands special 
consideration, especially for those interested in improving global 
social welfare and in using law and regulation to support that effort. 
The Global Impact Investing Network (“GIIN”), an industry 
association for social finance, defines impact investments as follows:  
Impact investments are investments made into companies, 
organizations and funds with the intention to generate social 
and environmental impact alongside a financial return.  
Impact investments can be made in both emerging and 
developed markets, and target a range of returns from below 
market to market rate, depending on the circumstances.13   
                                                     
11 See J.P. MORGAN & GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, SPOTLIGHT ON THE 
MARKET: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY 4-9 (2014), http://www.thegiin.org/binary-
data/2014MarketSpotlight.PDF (presenting a survey conducted among 125 impact 
investors concluding that about $60 billion was invested in 2013). 
12 See Sasha Dichter et al., Impact Investing: Closing the Pioneer Gap, STAN.  SOCIAL 
INNOVATION REV. 42-43 (Winter 2013), http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2187/ 
docview/1265597236?pq-origsite=summon (providing a helpful examination of 
this figure); see also WEF REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (establishing that the value of 
the impact investment market might reach between $400 billion and $1 trillion by 
2020). 
13 See What Is Impact Investing?, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, 
http://www.thegiin.org/cgi-bin/iowa/resources/about/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015) (providing an outline on the definition, key characteristics, and 
function of impact investing). 
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Speaking to investors, the GIIN website goes on to explain that 
“investments are made into enterprises and funds that expand 
access to critical goods and services, and/or generate positive 
impact through their operations.  For example, investors may seek 
to use investments to increase access to financial services, education, 
healthcare, affordable housing or quality employment by 
underserved populations.”14  
The GIIN’s definition helps to make an important distinction 
between social finance and socially responsible investing (“SRI”).  
Specifically, impact investing or social finance can be understood as 
an enriched form of SRI, or as “SRI-plus.”  The onus on businesses 
receiving impact investments is not only to avoid contributing to 
social and environmental harms, which is the domain of 
conventional SRI, but also to produce social and environmental 
benefits for the company’s stakeholders, who extend far beyond 
shareholders—the communities they work in, the individuals they 
employ, and the public at large.  While conventional SRI screens out 
companies that produce social or environmental harms (e.g., 
tobacco, weapons, alcohol, gambling),15 impact investing seeks 
actively to benefit society, and to do so profitably wherever 
possible.16  In short, social finance is promoted precisely as a move 
away from the “‘social responsibility’ mind-set in which societal 
issues are at the periphery, not the core.”17   
While the range of social finance activities is broad, two 
important common denominators can be identified.  First, the 
purpose of social finance is to advance social welfare by channeling 
capital into businesses that fill gaps in the provisioning of socially 
beneficial goods and services to underserved demographics.  These 
gap-filling activities must be carried out in a way that is at least 
commercially sustainable, if not profitable.  The second common 
denominator pertains to the category of individuals who are 
                                                     
14 Id.   
15 See MATT KROGH, B. CORP., CHANNELING INVESTMENT FOR IMPACT: NEW 
RATING SYSTEM HELPS INVESTORS MOVE BEYOND RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2009), 
https://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/20
09AP-Channeling-Impact.pdf (elaborating on the SRI screening process).   
16 Mitchell L.  Strauss, Six Questions About Impact Investing, OPIC (June 5, 2012), 
http://www.opic.gov/blog/education/six-questions-about-impact-investing. 
17 Michael Porter & Mark Kramer, The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value, HARV.  
BUS.  REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2011), at 64. 
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supposed to see their lives improved as a result of social finance—
namely, the poor, who are referred to as beneficiaries.   
Often referred to as an “industry,”18 a “movement”19 or an “asset 
class,”20 social finance and impact investing are umbrella terms that 
describe a type of economic activity that seeks to do more than 
simply make money.  Drawing on the legacies of community 
development finance,21 social finance seeks to address social 
problems through market-based solutions.  These solutions differ 
fundamentally from those supported by philanthropy in the sense 
that they are designed to be commercially sustainable.  Thus, while 
philanthropy involves money gifts that are finite and uncertain, 
social finance seeks out investment opportunities that can generate 
self-perpetuating income streams.   
The social businesses that receive impact investments are just 
that:  businesses.  Their operations are financed through their 
revenues.  As such, they are different from non-profit organizations 
that often depend primarily on charitable contributions and grants 
to fund their work.  
Sir Ronald Cohen, chairman of Big Society Capital, the U.K.’s 
recently established social investment bank, explains that, “most 
charitable organizations are small and have no more than a few 
months of funding at their disposal.  Yet there is one resource—
vastly bigger than the resources currently available to either 
government or the social sector—that has remained largely 
untapped for social purposes:  the capital markets.”22  The market, 
private capital, and business acumen are increasingly being called 
                                                     
18 Id. at 67. 
19 JESSICA FREIREICH & KATHERINE FULTON, MONITOR INST., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR CATALYZING AN EMERGING INDUSTRY 9 
(Jan. 2009), http://www.monitorinstitute.com/impactinvesting    [hereinafter 
MONITOR]. 
20 NICK O’DONAHOE, ET AL., J.P. MORGAN & ROCKEFELLER FOUND., IMPACT 
INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLASS 24-29 (2010) [hereinafter EMERGING ASSET 
CLASS], http://nonprofitfinancefund.org/files/11-29- 
10jpmorganchaserockefellergiin- abl.pdf. 
21 Community development uses tax incentives to attract investment into 
underserved areas to increase the availability of affordable housing, for example, 
and Community Development Financial Institutions provide credit and financial 
services to underserved markets and populations.  Id. at 7. 
22 Sir Ronald Cohen, Big Society Capital Marks a Paradigm Shift, STAN. SOCIAL 
INNOVATION REV. 21 (Summer 2012), http://www.ronaldcohen.org/ 
sites/default/files/3/Summer%20202012_Big%20Society%20Capital%20Marks%2
0a%20Paradigm%20Shift.pdf. 
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upon to supplement public and philanthropic initiatives to solve 
social problems.23  Faced with a problematic combination of 
dwindling resources and serious global social problems, 
government, international development organizations, and 
foundations are under pressure to identify ways to crowd in private 
investment in order to finance social goods.24     
Market-based approaches to social problem solving are 
promoted on the view that public spending on social welfare, 
development assistance, and philanthropy are generally ineffective:  
Traditional approaches tend to address unmet needs for 
health care, clean water, or other basic necessities by setting 
targets for meeting those needs through direct public 
investments, subsidies, or other handouts.  The goals may be 
worthy, but the results have not been strikingly successful.  
A market-based approach . . . looks for solutions in the form 
of new products and business models that can provide goods 
and services at affordable prices . . . .  Perhaps most 
important, traditional approaches do not point toward 
sustainable solutions – while a market-oriented approach 
recognizes that only sustainable solutions can scale to meet 
the needs of 4 billion people.25  
Commercial sustainability is a very important pillar of social 
finance.  When an impact investment generates a financial return 
                                                     
23 Mirjam Schöning et al., Taking a Realistic Approach to Impact Investing: 
Observations from the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Social 
Innovation, M.I.T. INNOVATIONS J. 168-69 (2011), http://www.weforum.org/pdf/ 
schwafound/TakingARealisticApproachToImpactInvesting_MIT_Innovations. 
pdf. 
24 See Jean-Michel Severino & Olivier Ray, The End of ODA: Death and Rebirth of 
Public Policy 5-6 (Ctr. for Global Development, Working Paper No. 167, 2009),      
available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1421419_file_End_of_ 
ODA_ FINAL.pdf (detailing the expansion of non-governmental actors in the 
funding of international development); see also WEF REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 
(“Social issues continually present significant fiscal challenges for governments of 
developed, emerging and frontier economies . . . .  Philanthropic organizations – 
while noble and needed – will not be able to solve the most pressing social problems 
alone due to their limited resources . . . .  Impact investing offers an opportunity to 
creatively fund projects that may otherwise go unfunded, while also helping to 
scale organizations with viable business models”).   
25 NEXT 4 BILLION, supra note 5, at 11, 6–7  (defining the base of the economic 
pyramid, or “BoP,” in the context of emerging markets, as “those with annual 
incomes up to and including $3000 per capita per year,” which, when combined, 
constitutes a $5 trillion global consumer market). 
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sufficient to sustain itself, it has done what philanthropy and public 
assistance cannot:  It has tapped into the forces of market, 
ownership, and innovation to create the means for its own 
reproduction, and reduced (ideally, eliminated) the dependency on 
“free” money.26  As exemplified by microfinance, one strand of 
social finance:  “For many, the revolutionary appeal of the 
microfinance movement was that poverty might be alleviated in a 
way that does not require continuous subsidies.”27 
The policy of privatizing public goods (e.g., energy and water, 
healthcare, and policing) has been pursued in many economies for a 
long time and has been subject to both positive and negative 
critiques.28  In a sense, social finance takes privatization to a new 
level by reframing social problems as market opportunities.  In fact, 
social finance creates a new market where social impact is 
transformed into a commodity that can be invested in and traded.  
This is both promising and problematic.  This is promising because 
additional money and innovation are being deployed in the service 
of solving a wide range of social problems.  This is also problematic 
because establishing a new market for social impact creates 
openings for new types of market failures that can cause harm to 
social finance beneficiaries, as discussed below. 
Some worry that by injecting market logic and expectations of 
return into the social goods arena, social finance will negatively alter 
the framework for making decisions about what problems to solve 
and what initiatives to finance.  To clarify, with social finance, 
capital chases enterprises that generate both financial and social 
returns; this creates a concern that initiatives that produce only (or 
mostly) social returns will become under-funded.  The same concern 
applies to initiatives that produce social impact over a long period 
of time or in a way that isn’t easily measurable.  For example, critics 
like Michael Edwards fear that the marketization of social impact 
                                                     
26 See, e.g., WEF REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 (presenting how free-cash flow 
enables the evaluation of a company’s financial performance); see also SOCIAL 
FINANCE, A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS CAN 
MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 7 (2012), 
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFina
nceWPSingleFINAL_0.pdf       (explaining that “Unlike public sector or grant 
funding, impact investments produce financial returns that can be reinvested in the 
social sector”). 
27 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 52.  
28 See generally JODY FREEMAN, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
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and the attending emphasis on measurable returns will sideline the 
less-quantifiable work of civil society and non-profit groups that 
have proven successful in bringing about lasting social change.29   
Edwards cautions that institutionalizing market approaches 
within the social provisioning sphere can narrow the social 
problem-solving toolkit in a way that favors marketable solutions 
rather than impactful ones:  “[P]hilanthropy was valued precisely 
because of its ability to fund organizations and activities that did not 
make . . . returns and whose success could not be measured by short-
term standard metrics.”30  He adds that a serious problem arises 
when “one particular approach dominates all others so that the tools 
of business and measurement are conflated with the underlying 
ideologies of the market and technocracy . . . with the result that 
equally-valuable alternatives are being displaced and delegitimized, 
leaving large areas of work unsupported or under-funded.”31 
Social finance and impact investing have tremendous potential 
for bringing more self-sustaining capital and initiative to bear on 
solving pressing social problems.  However, establishing a market 
for social impact—a project in which SSEs actively participate—also 
creates new risks of market failure that matter for both investors and 
beneficiaries.  As explained below, these risks must be addressed in 
order to protect investor and beneficiary interests, as well as the 
integrity of the market.  
 
2.2.  The Business Side:  Impact Investors and Social Businesses  
 
So how does social finance work? There are a few models but the 
one that is most relevant for our purposes involves impact investors 
putting their capital behind businesses that interface directly with 
under-served populations by making socially beneficial goods and 
services—including quality employment—available to them.  This 
model introduces the three main protagonists in the social finance 
                                                     
29 Michael Edwards, Who Gains, Who Loses? Distributional Impacts of the New 
Philanthropic Marketplace, in NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY: A GUIDE TO THE NEW 
TOOLS AND ACTORS RESHAPING GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL INVESTING 539, 
546-47 (Lester M. Salamon, ed. 2014) [hereinafter Edwards]. 
30 Edwards, supra note 29, at 539. 
31 Id. at 540. 
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story:  impact investors, social businesses, and crucially, the 
beneficiaries.   
 
2.2.1.  Impact Investors 
 
Impact investors are varied and have varying expectations of 
social and financial returns.  A brief overview of the composition of 
the GIIN Investors Council illustrates this point.  The Council 
comprises private foundations (e.g., Rockefeller Foundation, W.K. 
Kellogg Foundation, and Citi Foundation), institutional investors, 
financial services firms, wealth managers (e.g., Prudential, TIAA-
CREF, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Big Society Capital, and J.P. Morgan), 
non-profit investment funds (e.g., National Community Investment 
Fund and Root Capital), and development finance institutions (e.g., 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation).32  Individuals who buy shares in social 
businesses or who make equity or loan investments in such 
enterprises are another type of impact investor.  This type of investor 
might also invest in socially driven Kickstarter projects, or make 
loans to micro-entrepreneurs in developing countries through 
websites like Kiva.   
Investors also have different expectations of return and different 
motivations for engaging in social finance.  While the common goal 
is to generate social impact alongside financial returns, some 
investors prioritize impact over financial gains, while others 
prioritize financial gains.  Thus, some are described as “impact-
first,” while others are described as “finance-first.”33  Over time, and 
as the impact investing space has grown, these dichotomies have 
become less clear-cut and more nuanced:  “[F]und investors have 
any number of reasons for their involvement in impact investing.  
Their engagement can be informed by deeply-held values and 
convictions; strategic institutional/mission priorities; rules and 
regulations; or, of course, risk and return objectives.”34  
                                                     
32 EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 16. 
33 MONITOR, supra note 19, at 31. 
34 INSIGHT AT PACIFIC COMMUNITY VENTURES ET AL., IMPACT INVESTING 2.0: THE 
WAY FORWARD (2013), available at http://www.pacificcommunityventures.org/ 
impinv2/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013FullReport_sngpg.v8.pdf. 
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A central contention of this article is that, even though it is not 
always clear what drives investors, and even though there is an 
understandable eagerness to be inclusive in efforts to attract 
additional investment into the social finance space, it is nevertheless 
important to be selective about which investors should be invited 
under the impact umbrella. The less investors care about their 
investments achieving a positive social impact, the less likely they 
are to offer meaningful support to their investees in fulfilling their 
social mission.  Furthermore, the less investors care about positive 
social outcomes, the more likely they are to pressure investees to 
prioritize profitability over impact.  Both of these situations are 
problematic because they can harm beneficiaries.   
In other words, investor motivations matter and investor 
selectivity is a powerful mechanism for attracting the “right” type of 
investor into the social finance space and for ensuring the health and 
safety of the market for social impact.  How one might go about 
designing and operationalizing such a selection mechanism is a 
question that will be addressed in the discussion on SSEs below.   
 
2.2.2.  Social Businesses 
 
The businesses that receive impact investments are referred to as 
“social businesses,” “social enterprises,”35 or “inclusive 
businesses.”36  For convenience, I mostly use the first term.  Social 
businesses aim to achieve multiple bottom line returns by profitably, 
expanding access to needed goods and services for under-served 
                                                     
35 For a definition of social entrepreneurs, see Alex Nicholls, Social Enterprise 
and Social Entrepreneurs, CIVIL SOCIETY 148 (2d ed, Polity, 2009); see generally REPORT 
OF THE UN COMMISSION ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND DEVELOPMENT TO THE SECRETARY 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNLEASHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP: MAKING 
BUSINESS WORK FOR THE POOR (2004), available at 
http://web.undp.org/cpsd/documents/report/english/fullreport.pdf. 
36 One article describes the difference as follows: “Social enterprises are for-
profit entities with a mission to address social, environmental or otherwise 
development-related needs.  An inclusive business, on the other hand, contributes 
to poverty reduction through the inclusion of low-income communities in its value 
chain.” Pete Troilo, Are Social Stock Exchanges The Great Equalizer to Democratize 
Development Finance?, DEVEXIMPACT (July 12, 2013), https://www.devex.com/en/ 
news/are-social-stock-exchanges-the-great-equalizer-to-democratize-
development-finance [hereinafter Troilo]. 
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populations.37  For these entities, creating positive social impact is a 
core component of the business model; that is, social impact is the 
business.38  In principle, the better a social business is at solving 
problems and pursuing its mission, the more successful it will be, 
both financially and socially.39     
MFIs are the leading example of social businesses that serve the 
poor in developing countries.  These institutions make small loans 
available to the poor, and are pioneers in the pursuit of double 
bottom line returns, having done so since (at least) the 1970s.40  They 
cater to individuals who would otherwise not be able to access credit 
because they do not meet loan eligibility requirements.41  To clarify, 
for many conventional banks, it is difficult to lend to individuals 
who have neither credit history nor collateral to secure the loan in 
case of a default, which is the case for most micro-borrowers.42  It is 
also more expensive and burdensome to lend small amounts of 
money to a multitude of borrowers, rather than make larger loans to 
a smaller number of (more affluent) borrowers.43  This challenge is 
compounded when borrowers are located in hard to reach areas, 
such as scattered rural villages.44 
In contrast to conventional lenders, MFIs are designed to cater 
precisely to this difficult-to-service population, and in doing so they 
fill an important need.45  By making financial services available to 
the under-served, MFIs fill a credit gap that discriminates against 
                                                     
37 EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 8. 
38 Cummings, infra note 60, at 581-582.  See also, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://socialstockexchange.com/faqs/(explaining 
that Corporate Social Responsibility describes activities through which companies 
give back to society (e.g., via charitable donations, volunteer staff, and 
commitments to reduce waste), but do not constitute the companies’ core.). 
39 Eldar, infra note 78 at 17 (explaining that whereas donative organizations 
transfer subsidies by simply giving goods to beneficiaries (e.g. bed nets or water 
purifiers), social enterprises employ capital to produce goods and services for sale 
and depend on their patrons to remain commercially sustainable). 
40 BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 21-29. 
41 Todd Arena, Social Corporate Governance and the problem of Mission Drift in 
Socially-Oriented Microfinance Institutions, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 269, 270-73 
n.108 (2008) [hereinafter Arena]. 
42 Id. at 278. 
43 Id. 
44 BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 7. 
45 Eldar, infra note 78 at 8-9 (describing the main benefit that MFIs confer on 
beneficiaries as the “opportunity to borrow” and social businesses as those that 
transact with beneficiaries who cannot transact with profit-maximizing firms).   
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the poor.  Having access to credit makes it possible for micro-
borrowers to invest in improving their own livelihoods, which they 
can do through the purchase of goods and services like food, school 
books, or medical visits; borrowers could also use the loan to buy a 
piece of equipment like a cell phone charger that they “rent” out to 
others for a fee, a sewing machine, or livestock to start a business 
and generate income.46  Some MFIs also fill a social development gap 
by providing financial literacy training and other social 
programming designed to “empower” borrowers to make better use 
of the financial services the MFI provides.47  
MFIs are an important reference for understanding what it 
means to operate as a social business because they are designed to 
be both socially impactful and financially profitable, and many are 
quite profitable.  This is because the loans that they extend must be 
repaid, and often at a high rate of interest.  Globally, the median 
interest yield was 27% in 2011, with an even higher Annual 
Percentage Rate, and some MFIs charge over 100%.48   
Aravind Eye Care System is an Indian non-profit that also works 
in the health sector.  It makes affordable blindness-prevention 
surgery available to poor patients.  It performs about 350,000 eye 
operations per year, 60%of which are delivered at low or no cost.49  
Aravind encompasses a network of hospitals and clinics that charge 
market rates to patients who can afford to pay the full price in order 
to subsidize or completely waive fees for patients who cannot.50   
In the energy sector, Husk Power Systems transforms rice husks 
into electricity and sells “micro-power” to over 200,000 individuals 
in rural communities across India.51  Users are charged a variable fee 
                                                     
46 See, e.g., Kiva Borrowers, available at http://www.kiva.org/lend (providing 
examples of the types of activities that micro-loans can finance). 
47 Arena, supra note 41, at 281, 49. 
48 RICHARD ROSENBURG ET AL., MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES AND THEIR 
DETERMINANTS – 2004 TO 2011, (Reports by CGAP and its Partners, No. 7, 2013) 
[hereinafter CGAP]; see also, Neil MacFarquhar, Banks Making Big Profits from Tiny 
Loans, N.Y.  TIMES, April 13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/04/14/world/14microfinance.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter Big Profits]; 
Elizabeth Rhyne, Why Are Microfinance Rates So High?, HUFFINGTON POST, May 28, 
2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elisabeth-rhyne/why-are-
microfinance-inte_b_593359.html. 
49 TRACEY VICKERS & ELLEN ROSEN, DRIVING DOWN THE COST OF HIGH QUALITY 
CARE: LESSONS FROM THE ARAVIND EYECARE SYSTEM 19 (Health International, No. 11, 
2011), available at http://www.aravind.org/Downloads/draravindinterview.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 Husk Power Systems, ACUMEN (Aug. 17, 2014), 
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depending on the type and size of appliance they need to power.52  
Husk increases access to electricity in areas that are under-served by 
public utilities.  This makes doing business easier and cheaper for 
enterprises that depend on a reliable supply of electricity to support 
their operations.  Access to electricity also makes it possible for 
households to power necessary appliances, such as lamps that 
children can study under at night.53  Husk also contributes to the 
local economy by training locals to operate the power plants and 
training women to make incense with the husk ash, which can then 
be sold to increase household income.54  Finally, electricity is both 
cleaner and greener as a power source than kerosene, which is 
beneficial to the health of both individual users and the planet.55 
Some social businesses focus on creating and expanding 
employment opportunities for beneficiaries.  For these entities, the 
social mission is job creation and workplace development.  The 
beneficiary focus is on individuals who are at a disadvantage in the 
labor force due to some sort of vulnerability, such as a physical 
disability or a disadvantageous immigration status.56   
In the employment area, Hot Bread Kitchen (HBK) is a bakery in 
New York City (NYC) that recruits hard-to-employ immigrant 
women to make baked goods.  The revenues from the sale of those 
goods are used to fund skill-building programs in order to help 
employees graduate to more senior positions in the food industry:  
“[HBK] combines two traditionally separate models: a social welfare 
model that guides its workforce development mission and a revenue 
generation model that guides its commercial activities.”57  This 
business model is clearly inspired by worker cooperatives, where 
resources are pooled and redistributed among members. 
                                                     
http://acumen.org/investment/husk-power-systems/. 
52 ASHDEN AWARDS, CASE STUDY SUMMARY: HUSK POWER SYSTEMS INDIA (2011), 
available at http://www.ashden.org/files/Husk%20winner.pdf (explaining that a 
basic connection supplies two 15WCFL lights and phone charging for US$2.20 per 
month). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Eldar, infra note 78, at 13 (referring to these social businesses as Work 
Integration Social Enterprises that hire disadvantaged employees who suffer from 
“systemic unemployment”).   
57 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 51. 
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Another example of an employment-focused social business is 
Goodwill Industries.  Goodwill collects donated and used clothing, 
which it resells at Goodwill stores.  The proceeds from the sales are 
used, in part, to fund job-training and placement programs for the 
communities serviced by any one of the 165 Goodwill agencies 
working across the U.S. and Canada.58 
 
2.2.3.  Social Business 2.0:  Make it Legal-ish 
 
Certain social businesses commit to a double or triple bottom 
line business model through their legal structures.  For example, in 
the U.S., companies can signal their commitment to advancing the 
interests of both shareholders and stakeholders—both the 
community that is directly served by the entity or its target 
beneficiaries and the environment—by incorporating as a “benefit 
corporation.”  The first state to adopt a benefit corporation statute 
was Maryland, in 2010, and 30 States (including Delaware) have 
since followed suit.59  Similarly, in the U.K., businesses can 
incorporate as Community Interest Corporations, or CICs, whose 
activities are “for the benefit of the community.”60  CICs were first 
established as part of the Companies Act in 2004 and are overseen 
by a dedicated CIC Regulator.61  
Benefit corporations are relatively new creatures on the 
corporate landscape.  As a result, it is still rather early to assess their 
compliance with applicable rules.  Nevertheless, initial studies have 
found that compliance with benefit corporation reporting 
                                                     
58 See GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., THE GOOD BUSINESS MODEL 
AT GOODWILL, available at http://www.goodwill.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
12/Goodwills-Successful-Social-Enterprise-Model.pdf (discussing the 
employment-focused “social enterprise” business model of Goodwill Industries).   
59 Benefit Corp., State by State Status of Legislation, 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Aug. 12, 
2015). 
60 Matthew F.  Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and 
International Analysis, 20 DUKE J.  COMP. & INT’L L.  291, 313 (2010) [hereinafter 
Doeringer]; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations−−A Sustainable Form 
of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.  591, 593 (2011); Briana Cummings, Benefit 
Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 578, 586 (2012) [hereinafter Cummings].  
61 Doeringer, supra note 60, at 312. 
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requirements is “abysmal,” at less than 10%.62  Perhaps because the 
Secretaries of State are under-resourced and still unfamiliar with the 
workings of benefit corporation law, there has been little or no 
enforcement on the government side. 63  Further, enforcement by 
stakeholders wanting to bring a claim against a benefit corporation 
is limited to the so-far untested device of Benefit Enforcement 
Proceedings.  And, since automatic standing for such proceedings is 
given only to shareholders, directors, and owners of 5% or more of 
the equity in the benefit corporation’s parent company, stakeholders 
will likely remain “relatively helpless in enforcing their rights.”64 
As a dedicated agency that has been active for over ten years, the 
CIC Regulator has considerably more experience overseeing social 
businesses than its U.S. counterparts.  In general, CIC rules are more 
detailed, stringent, developed, and better enforced than benefit 
corporation rules.  We will return to them below in the discussion 
on improving SSE regulation—in particular, the limitations on 
dividends and on the transfer of CIC assets.  CIC rules are also more 
advanced with respect to the tax treatment of CIC investments and 
experiments are underway to provide tax relief to CIC investors,65 a 
prospect that remains distant for U.S. investors.  
As concerns enforcement, the CIC Regulator has removed over 
three thousand CICs from its register over the course of eight years 
for various reasons, including failure to file accounts in a timely 
manner and failure to file statutory documents.66  The CIC Regulator 
                                                     
62 Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2) (draft on file with author) (collecting benefic 
corporation compliance data and putting claims about heightened transparency 
into question). 
63 Id. (manuscript at 20) (referencing Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 301(a), 
305(c), which lists seven groups of stakeholders that directors must consider, 
including shareholders, employees, customers, community, and environment). 
64 Id. 
65 See Finance Act, 2014, c. 26, § 57, schs. 11 & 12 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/26/pdfs/ukpga_20140026_en.pdf 
(granting income tax relief to individuals who invest in social enterprises); see also 
CABINET OFFICE, HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS, & HM TREASURY, GUIDANCE: SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT TAX RELIEF (2015), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-investment-tax-relief-
factsheet/social-investment-tax-relief (“Social    investment  tax  relief  (SITR)  is  
the  government’s   tax   relief   for  social  investment  which  encourages  
individuals  to support  social  enterprises and helps them access new sources of 
finance.”).  
66 THE OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, 
CIC/14/972, ANNUAL REPORT 2013/2014, at 22-23, available at https://www.gov. 
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also provides a mechanism through which individual stakeholders 
(e.g. customers, community members, or employees) can file 
complaints against CICs.67  It bears noting that such complaints 
doubled between 2013 and 2014.68  The Regulator has the power to 
investigate and act on complaints that fall under its purview, for 
example by de-registering a CIC or mandating a wind down.  
On the non-legal or voluntary end of the social regulation 
spectrum, businesses anywhere in the world can choose to undergo 
the “B Impact Assessment” created by a U.S. non-profit, B Lab, and 
obtain a certification as a B (for “benefit”) Corporation.69  This 
certification can be included on product packaging and company 
promotional materials.  Some of the better-known B-certified 
businesses in the U.S. include Cabot Creamery Cooperative, Method 
Products, Ben and Jerry’s Homemade Holdings, and Warby 
Parker.70   
Because certification schemes are voluntary, there is relatively 
little to say about legal enforcement.  This should not be taken to 
mean that certifications have no regulatory power, however.  In the 
case of B Corporation Certifications, companies must achieve a 
minimum score on the impact assessment; every two years, 
companies can renew their certification by undergoing the 
assessment again and verifying that their performance remains in 
line with B Lab’s standards.71  If, at the two-year renewal period, a 
company’s score falls below the required minimum, the certification 
will not be renewed and the company will be “de-certified.”72  In B 
                                                     
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/330648/CIC-
14-972_-regulator-of-community-interest-companies-annual-report-2013-2014.pdf 
[hereinafter CIC ANNUAL REPORT 2013/2014].    
67 THE OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, 
COMPLAINTS ABOUT COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES (2009), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/463751/09-1650-commumity-interest-companies-complaint-about-cics-
leaflet.pdf.      
68 CIC ANNUAL REPORT 2013/2014, supra note 66, at 24. 
69 WHAT ARE B CORPS?, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
70 B CORP COMMUNITY, http://www.bcorporation.net/b-corp-community (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
71 B LAB PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS, 
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-
corp/performance-requirements (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
72 Email Interview with Staff Member, Katie Holcomb, Director of 
Communications, B Lab (Oct. 3, 2015) (email on file with author) [hereinafter 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/4
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Lab’s experience, only 2-3% of B Corps have been de-certified, either 
due to performance or because they went out of business or just 
opted to leave “the community.”73   
These figures indicate that, while there are no legal 
consequences attached to non-compliance, compliance with 
certification requirements is nevertheless high.  This is not entirely 
surprising given that the types of entities that seek out—and pay 
for—a certification are typically also invested in keeping it.  Still, the 
initial findings suggest that the prospect of reputational rather than 
legal liability has real regulatory power and that voluntary regimes 
can sometimes be more effective at regulating subscribers than 
official regulation.   
The emergence of new corporate forms like CICs and benefit 
corporations is relevant for a few reasons.  First, it shows the degree 
to which policy and lawmakers support the idea of deploying 
private capital and business acumen to improve social welfare.  
Second, these new forms highlight the importance of corporate 
law—both hard and soft—for the regulation of social businesses 
and, by extension, social finance.  While this article is more focused 
on securities regulation, corporate law—particularly social 
enterprise law—is also critical for upgrading the social regulatory 
framework.  This article draws heavily on the lessons (being) 
learned in the corporate arena to formulate recommendations for 
improving SSE regulatory performance.  
Third, the CIC and benefit corporation models allow 
comparisons between official government approaches to regulation 
and other approaches, such as private certification schemes and 
SSEs.  The juxtaposition of official and private—and voluntary—
regulation is helpful for understanding how norms travel between 
the public and private spheres, changing both in the process.  It also 
helps for understanding how new markets, such as the market for 
social impact, can become regulated through a combination of 
public and private rules.  Indeed, social finance regulation is a 
natural subject for “new governance” scholars who “challenge the 
conventional wisdom that effective regulation should involve top-
down and command-and-control rules, while rejecting a complete 
shift . . . toward pure market or self-regulation.”74  SSEs fit here 
                                                     
Interview with B Lab staff member]. 
73 Id. 
74 Tamara C. Belifanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, DEL. J. CORP. 
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because they establish a private voluntary framework for regulating 
social businesses and investors that is very much in conversation 
with official regulation. 
To summarize, impact investors and social businesses are not 
homogenous.  They come in different shapes and sizes and provide 
a wide range of products and services.  Crucially, they have different 
expectations of financial and social return.  Though social businesses 
and investors share an intention to achieve both social impact and 
financial returns, mere intent is not enough to truly differentiate 
them from their conventional counterparts.  Yet, if the market for 
social impact is to have integrity, the distinctions between social and 
conventional must be meaningful.  Both official and voluntary 
regulatory regimes have an important role to play in making such 
distinctions real.  While the promise of blending social and financial 
imperatives has a “beguiling charm,”75 it is also volatile because 
maintaining equilibrium between the different involved interests is 
a delicate task.  This is of particular concern when businesses are in 
a position to profit from the poor and generate financial returns 
through transactions with disadvantaged populations, as discussed 
below.   
 
2.3.  The Beneficiaries 
 
Social finance beneficiaries are those whose lives should be 
improved by social businesses and impact investments.  This group 
is comprised of a heterogeneous population of billions, residing all 
over the world—both in rich and poor countries.76  In spite of the 
many differences in geographical location, culture, ethnicity, and 
race (to name a few), social finance beneficiaries share a few 
                                                     
L., 786, 801 (2014) [hereinafter Belifanti]; see also Kevin Kolben, Transnational Labor 
Regulation and the Limits of Governance, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 403, 436-37 
(2011) (arguing that the governance models applied to transnational labor 
regulation are not suitable for developing states and proposing alternatives). 
75 Cummings, supra note 60, at 627.   
76 See generally NEXT 4 BILLION, supra note 5.  Even though most of the BoP 
literature focuses on emerging markets, similar “market opportunities” also exist at 
the lower end of the income spectrum in rich countries, for example, in the housing 
and financial sectors.  See Adrian Wooldridge, The Bottom Of The Pyramid: Businesses 
Are Learning To Serve The Growing Number Of Hard-Up Americans, THE ECONOMIST, 
June 23, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18863898 (“But even in one of 
the world’s richest countries the hard-up represent a huge and growing market.”). 
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important characteristics—including, most importantly, some form 
of vulnerability.77   
For our purposes, it helps to separate beneficiaries into two 
general categories.  The first is comprised of individuals who 
purchase goods and services from a social business or who work for 
such a business.  I refer to these individuals as Customer-
Beneficiaries and Worker-Beneficiaries, respectively. 78   The second 
category is comprised of individuals who simply receive social 
goods and services (for free) through initiatives that make 
innovative use of the capital markets to finance social goods and 
services (e.g. vaccinations79 and pre-release programs for 
prisoners80).  I refer to these individuals as Pure-Beneficiaries.  This 
article is primarily concerned with the beneficiaries that fall under 
the first category, meaning those who transact with market-based 
providers to access social goods and services.   
In developing countries, this demographic is targeted by the 
“BoP proposition,” which maintains that there are vast untapped 
resources at the bottom of the economic pyramid that can be 
profitably harnessed by selling goods and services to the poor.81  The 
                                                     
77 Kirk Davidson, Ethical Concerns at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Where CSR Meets 
BOP, 2 J. INT’L BUS. ETHICS 22, 28-29 (2009). 
78 Other scholars use similar terms.  See Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise 
and Hybrid Organizations (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy 
Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 485, 2014) [hereinafter Eldar] (referring 
to individuals who purchase goods and services from a social enterprise or who 
provide input or labor to such a business as “patron-beneficiaries”). 
79 For example, the International Financing Facility for Immunizations issues 
government-backed bonds on capital markets to finance vaccination programs in 
developing countries.  Bond proceeds are transferred to a public-private 
partnership, the GAVI Alliance, which then distributes funds to developing 
country governments to support national health programs. OVERVIEW, 
http://www.iffim.org/about/overview/ (last visited August 17, 2015). 
80 For example, Social Finance, Inc. in the U.K. issued the first social impact 
bond in 2010, raising about $8 million from 17 investors.  Target beneficiaries 
comprise three thousand prisoners who are approaching release.  Proceeds are used 
to fund recidivism reduction programs and investor returns are measured in 
proportion to the government savings brought about by lowered recidivism. 
SOCIAL FINANCE, INC., A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
CAN MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD (2012), at 9, available at 
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFina
nceWPSingleFINAL.pdf.  N.Y.C. recently established a similar program with a city-
guaranteed loan from Goldman Sachs.  David W. Chen, Goldman to Invest in City 
Jail Program, Profiting if Recidivism Falls Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at A14.   
81 “The poor” is technically defined as the 2.5 billion people who live on less 
than $2 per day. Aneel Karnani, Romanticizing the Poor, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 
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idea is that, by meeting BoP demand, businesses can profit from 
developing a new consumer base and contribute to poverty 
alleviation.82  The “win-win” approach that drives the BoP 
proposition resonates deeply among social finance proponents who 
seek to mainstream the notion that businesses can do well by doing 
good. 
There is also significant overlap between the BoP proposition 
and social finance in terms of how they are criticized.  Specifically, 
Karnani cautions that “fighting poverty with business” treads on 
dangerous ethical ground because of problematic assumptions 
about poor people:  “Proponents of these market solutions assume 
that poor people are fully capable and willing participants in free 
market economies” and that they are “well-informed and rational 
economic actors.”83  In reality, he explains, “the poor lack education, 
information, and other economic, cultural, and social capital that 
would allow them to take advantage of—and shield themselves 
against—the vagaries of the free market.”84  This critique highlights 
the vulnerability-enhancing effects of bringing the market to the BoP 
and vice versa.  The combination of financial and non-financial 
poverty renders these new “consumers” relatively easy to exploit.  
This is aggravated by the fact that the market is unpredictable, 
especially when it comes to advancing non-financial objectives, like 
social welfare.     
Beneficiaries are also vulnerable in the sense that they lack 
cushioning to absorb mistakes.  They can’t “afford a reversal of 
fortune generated by a loss, economic or other” brought about by an 
abusive transaction:  “The consequences of bad choices are bad for 
everyone, but even worse for the poor, who lack the resources—
financial, psychological, social, and political—to compensate for 
their errors.”85  It is, therefore, especially “important that inclusive 
                                                     
38, 38 (2009) [hereinafter Karnani]. 
82 See NEXT 4 BILLION, supra note 5, at 3 (“New empirical measures of [low-
income consumers’] aggregate purchasing power . . . suggest significant 
opportunities for market-based approaches to better meet their needs”); C.K. 
PRAHALAD, FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY 
THROUGH PROFITS (2004) (explaining how companies can profit from catering to the 
poor). 
83 Karnani, supra note 81, at 38-40. 
84 Id. at 40; BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 7.   
85 Ted London, A Base-of-the-Pyramid Perspective on Poverty Alleviation 32 
(William Davidson Inst./Stephen M. Ross Sch. of Bus. at the Univ. of Mich., 
Working Paper No. 31, 2007). 
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industries should always be vigilant on the question of impact on 
the poor—while we have described the position of the poor as 
customers or producers in relation to these business models, they 
are also the intended beneficiaries from an impact perspective.”86  
The events in Andhra Pradesh show that poor vigilance can have 
tragic consequences.  
As suggested above, one way to differentiate among 
beneficiaries is to make a distinction based on the nature of the 
beneficiary-social business relationship.  Thus, the Customer-
Beneficiary pays for social goods while the Worker-Beneficiary 
works for social goods.  As an example of the former, consider the 
individual borrower of a microfinance loan.  The typical micro-
borrower is female and poor in both financial and non-financial 
terms.  These characteristics tend to exclude her from access to 
conventional financial services and also subject her to various forms 
of social marginalization.  She is a customer in the sense that she 
does not simply receive money from an MFI,87 rather, she receives a 
loan that she must repay with interest—probably at a relatively high 
rate.88  The social good here is access to finance, as well as, 
depending on the MFI, financial literacy training and other 
programs designed to empower borrowers to make good use of 
borrowed funds.89  Micro-borrowers are one type of Customer-
Beneficiary who buys a social good (e.g. credit) from a social 
business (e.g. an MFI).   
Customer-Beneficiaries also include individuals who buy goods 
that are designed to affordably meet needs and improve lives.  
Examples of such goods include affordable housing; micro-power—
electricity sold in small increments to power a single appliance; 
water filtration devices, which are especially in demand in poor 
rural areas; joint cell phone ownership schemes; “clean” cook stoves 
that carry health and environmental benefits; individualized 
packets of laundry detergent that contribute to improving health 
and sanitation; and other goods and services that are sold in micro-
quantities or on a sliding scale like the Aravind eye surgeries.  In 
                                                     
86 BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 76. 
87 Eldar, supra note 78, at 17.  
88 CGAP, supra note 48; Big Profits, supra note 48. 
89 Arena, supra note 41, at 275-76 (describing “socially-oriented” MFIs as 
entities that “bundle non-financial services, typically educational or social services 
with financial services”). 
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each case, the Customer-Beneficiary must pay for the social good at 
issue in order to access benefits not made available through ordinary 
markets.   
Moving to Worker-Beneficiaries, these individuals work to 
access the social good, which is quality employment.  Consider the 
employees of HBK described earlier, “foreign born low income 
women” from non-English speaking countries.90  These 
characteristics make it difficult to find employment at a 
conventional business.  And, even if alternative employment were 
found, it is unlikely that it would pay a living wage or that it would 
afford these women the “benefits necessary to live a dignified life.”91  
This explains why HBK’s founder describes the people in her target 
group as “the most vulnerable workers in the labor force.”92  In 
addition to a salary, HBK employees benefit from training in baking 
and language classes, and can also receive support for their own 
projects, all of which should facilitate graduating to higher paying 
jobs in the NYC food industry.93  As indicated above, similar 
employment initiatives exist for people with disabilities or people 
coming out of prison.  Worker-Beneficiaries therefore work to access 
social goods provided by a social business, namely, quality 
employment (at least a living wage with benefits, such as skill-
building programs).   
As this typology suggests, social finance beneficiaries are not 
passive in their interactions with social businesses.  Rather, they are 
active, either as customers or as employees.  While beneficiaries 
have power—limited as it may be—to choose the social business(es) 
with which they transact, it is important not to confuse choice with 
invulnerability.  Social finance beneficiaries are identified as such 
precisely because they are excluded from the conventional 
marketplace as a result of financial or non-financial disadvantage—
or a combination.  This means that the social business-beneficiary 
dynamic is charged with vulnerability, and measures must be taken 
                                                     
90 HOT BREAD KITCHEN: ABOUT US, http://hotbreadkitchen.org/about-us/our-
mission (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
91 Jessamyn W. Rodriguez, 72 Ways To Change the World, EATER, http://www. 
eater.com/a/72-ways-food-can-change-the-world/jessamyn-rodriguez (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
92 Jessamyn W. Rodriguez, Now IS the Time, HOT BREAD KITCHEN (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://hotbreadkitchen.org/now-is-the-time. 
93 HOT BREAD KITCHEN: OUR MISSION, http://hotbreadkitchen.org/about-
us/our-mission (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
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to ensure that beneficiaries are not rendered more vulnerable or 
exploited through their transactions.  SSEs are important vehicles for 
designing and implementing such measures.  In a future piece, I will 
also consider the possibilities for regulating social finance through 
an upgraded consumer protection framework designed to better 
protect the ultra-vulnerable, meaning those Pure-Beneficiaries 
transitioning from relying on government assistance (domestic and 
international) to meet basic needs to being consumers in an under-
regulated market place of private providers. 
Social businesses and their investors are heterogeneous, a 
feature that should be welcomed in so far as it leads to a more 
diverse—and better-funded—array of social problem-solving 
initiatives.  But vigilance is required to ensure that commercial 
interests remain aligned with those of the already-vulnerable 
beneficiaries.  These individuals occupy a precarious position within 
the market for social impact:  They are both beneficiaries of life-
improving initiatives and the source of profitability for those 
initiatives.  While it may not be realistic to expect conventional 
businesses (and their investors) to make accommodations for their 
customers’ or their employees’ vulnerability, the ethical and moral 
imperative for social businesses to do so is very strong indeed.  The 
risk of interest misalignment must be regulated to protect 
beneficiaries and, by extension, the integrity of social finance. 
 
 
 
3.  THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE:  HYBRIDITY  
 
This Part draws attention to the special hybridity feature of 
social finance in order to show how social finance can “go wrong,” 
breaking its social promise.  It clarifies how the commercialization 
of social businesses can aggravate the risk of mission drift, which is 
inherent in entities that operate on double or triple bottom line 
business models.94  It calls for regulating hybridity and explains why 
SSEs have a potentially important role to play in this regard. 
 
                                                     
94 Tim Hindle, Triple Bottom Line, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2009), http:// 
www.economist.com/node/14301663. 
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3.1.  Social-Financial Hybridity  
 
Social finance is replete with hybridity.  Some even refer to a 
“hybridization movement,” the essence of which is “a fundamental 
convergence and reconfiguration of the social and commercial 
sectors, from completely separate fields to a common space.”95  As 
explained above, impact investors and social businesses are driven 
by two motives or “masters:”96 financial sustainability/profitability 
and social impact.  As distinct from philanthropy and public 
assistance, social finance is not ‘free’ in the sense that investors and 
social businesses expect returns consisting of some combination of 
financial and social gain.  This duality makes impact investors and 
social businesses different from conventional commercial investors 
and corporations, respectively; it also distinguishes them from 
charitable foundations and non-profit organizations, respectively.  
Due to its hybridity, social finance does not fit neatly into existing 
regulatory regimes, like securities regulation or charities regulation.  
In this sense, it defies the regulatory expectations of lawyers who are 
used to being able to segregate different areas of economic activity 
into different regulatory schemes.   
Social finance is characterized by a kind of “expectation-
hybridity.”  Investors expect investee social businesses to generate 
multiple bottom line returns.  Similarly, social businesses expect that 
the financing they receive will be hybrid or “patient capital,”97 
meaning financing that does not chase short-term financial returns, 
but rather adjusts in support of the enterprise’s core social mission.  
In other words, social businesses expect investments to “align with 
their goal of creating both social and economic value.”98  The 
expectations of beneficiaries are also hybrid.  Social finance 
beneficiaries harbor the expectations of a conventional customer or 
employee, but also those of consumers of public or non-profit 
services:  
                                                     
95 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 55. 
96 See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A 
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010) 
(describing the “dual purposes” of low-profit limited liability companies). 
97 ACUMEN FUND, supra note 10; Jacqueline Novogratz, Making a Case for Patient 
Capital, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAGAZINE (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/making-a-case-for-patient-capital-
10202011.html. 
98 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 55. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/4
  
2015] REGULATING SOCIAL FINANCE 171 
 
Traditional businesses usually think of their consumers as 
customers, whereas traditional nonprofits think of their 
consumer base as beneficiaries.  Hybrids, however, break 
this traditional customer-beneficiary dichotomy by 
providing products and services that, when consumed, 
produce social value.  When consumption yields both 
revenue and social value, customers and beneficiaries may 
become indistinguishable.99   
Social finance is also marked by “value-hybridity.”  The 
combination of social and financial objectives affects the definition 
of return on investment (“ROI”).  Indeed, the very concept of value 
is hybrid in the social finance space.  This is illustrated by Jed 
Emerson’s “blended value proposition,” which states that  
[A]ll organizations, whether for-profit or not, create value 
that consists of economic, social and environmental value 
components—and that investors simultaneously generate all 
three forms of value when they provide capital to 
organizations.  The outcome of all this activity is value 
creation and that value is itself non-divisible and, therefore, 
a blend of these three elements.100    
For subscribers to the blended value proposition, value is 
inherently hybrid, a mix of social, environmental, and financial 
outputs.  From this perspective, corporate entities, whether for-
profit or non-profit, do not produce only one or another type of 
value; instead, they produce all three simultaneously in greater or 
smaller proportion to one-another.  
 
3.2.  Measuring Social Impact:  A Complicated Proposition 
 
How does one measure impact or Social ROI?  This question is 
central to the entire discourse around social finance and impact 
investing.  To help answer it, this section provides an introduction 
to two tools that have been designed specifically to capture (and 
score) the social impact produced by social businesses:  the Impact 
                                                     
99 Id. at 53. 
100 Jed Emerson, The Blended Value Proposition: Integrating Social and Financial 
Returns, 45 CAL.  MGMT.  REV.  35, 44 (2003). 
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Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS) and the Global Impact 
Investing Rating System (GIIRS).101   
IRIS, a free public good, supplies a glossary of terms that equips 
users anywhere in the world with vocabulary for engaging in social 
finance activities.  It provides standard definitions for terms like 
“full time employment,” which some businesses may claim to create 
(“[f]ull-time paid employees work year round and typically work 
35-50 hours per week.  If local definitions of full-time equivalency 
differ, use appropriate standard”); “low income area” which many 
social businesses claim to serve (“[a] geographic area 
(neighborhood, village, other region) where the median family 
income is less than 80% of the median family income of the 
surrounding vicinity”); or “affordable housing,” which some 
businesses claim to provide (“[h]ousing for which the associated 
financial costs are at a level that does not threaten other basic needs 
and represents a reasonable proportion of an individual’s overall 
income.”.102  IRIS also provides a menu of performance metrics for 
different types of impact investments, such as investments in 
housing, agriculture, financial services, or water.  For example, a 
housing developer might consider tracking the percentage of 
affordable housing units created, the number of individuals housed, 
or the number of new businesses created as a result of the 
development.103   
Businesses can select the metrics that are most relevant for their 
area of work, and then track their own social performance.  The data 
could then be included in financial and social reports, or it could be 
used for operational purposes, to set new company policy.  For 
instance, an MFI looking to upgrade its reporting might choose to 
disclose the Effective Interest Rate charged to borrowers, the 
number of borrowers per loan officer, or the number of loans 
disbursed during the reporting period.104  Should these figures 
                                                     
101 IRIS: Introduction, https://iris.thegiin.org/introduction (last visited Feb.  
28, 2015); see also Sarah Dadush, Impact Investment Indicators: A Critical Assessment, 
IN GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND 
RANKINGS 392, 402-11 (Davis et al. eds., 2012) (evaluating the challenges of 
measuring social impact through tools such as the GIIRS and IRIS) [hereinafter 
Dadush]. 
102 IRIS: GLOSSARY, https://iris.thegiin.org/glossary (last visited Sept. 12, 
2015). 
103 IRIS: GETTING STARTED WITH IRIS, https://iris.thegiin.org/guide/getting-
started-guide (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
104 IRIS Metrics, Financial Services: Microfinance, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING 
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exceed an industry-recommended, statutory, or firm-imposed 
maximum, the MFI could make adjustments.  The metrics could also 
be used by management to decide what firm-wide policies and 
standards to adopt, which in turn could inform firm thinking on the 
social mission.    
Taking IRIS a step further, GIIRS serves a judgment function by 
aggregating IRIS-compliant data into an overall impact rating.  The 
ratings are in the form of a star score—companies can receive one to 
five stars—and a percentage score, based on a maximum score 
achievable for a set of industry-specific questions.105  GIIRS is 
independent of the entities it rates and the ratings are intended to 
reduce due diligence costs for investors.  IRIS and GIIRS and other 
such tools106 produce needed “market intelligence” by generating 
information about the impact investing market and about specific 
investment opportunities.107   
IRIS and GIIRS are important contributors to a process I refer to 
as “blueprinting.”  I will explore the workings and limitations of 
blueprinting in depth in a future article, but some fundamentals are 
set out here to better frame the challenges facing SSEs.  Blueprinting 
happens when a new market, such as the market for social finance, 
is created based on a template that is set by an already-existing 
market, such as the market for conventional finance.  It explains the 
routine description of social finance as the social analog to 
                                                     
NETWORK, https://iris.thegiin.org/metrics (select “Financial services: 
Microfinance” checkbox under “Sectors of Focus”). 
105 GIIRS ASSESSMENT WEIGHTINGS AND STAR RATINGS, 
http://giirs.nonprofitsoapbox.com/about-giirs/how-giirs-works/165 (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2015); see also Beth Richardson, Sparking Impact Investing Through GIIRS, 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Sparking Impact Investing] 
(explaining that company ratings include (1) an overall rating; (2) an impact area 
rating in the fields of “Governance,” “Workers,” “Community,” and 
“Environment”; (3) detailed judgments on the company’s “Social or Environmental 
Business Model”; (4) key industry specific performance indicators; and (5) 
benchmarking based on the company’s geography, size and mission).   
106 Other social performance tools include: the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) – Sustainability Reporting Framework; Sustainable Livelihoods (SL), 
Demonstrating Value (DV), and Social Return on Investment (SROI). See Global 
Impact Investing Rating System: Related Tools and Methods, 
http://impactinvesting.marsdd.com/simt/global-impact-investing-rating-
system-giirs/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Global Impact Investing]. 
107 Amit Bouri, How Standards Emerge: The Role of Investor Leadership in Realizing 
the Potential of IRIS, 6 INNOVATIONS 145, 146, available at 
http://www.thegiin.org/binary-data/RESOURCE/download_file/000/000/288-
1.pdf. 
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conventional finance, which can be traced in the vocabulary of social 
finance, but also in the creation of new financial instruments and 
institutions for administering social finance. 
Thus, conventional investments convert into impact investments 
in the social finance space,108 and conventional bonds become “social 
impact bonds;”109 rather than traditional for-profit corporations we 
now have benefit corporations and CICs; the financing for social 
businesses can now come from specially constituted social finance 
banks, such as Big Society Capital in the U.K.;110 and SSEs have 
emerged as the social counterparts of CSEs.  Last but not least, the 
metrics developed for measuring financial performance in the 
conventional context, such as ROI, become Social Return on 
Investment (“SROI”), while IRIS is described as the social 
counterpart of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(“IFRS”)111 of the United States. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, and GIIRS are described as the counterparts of S&P credit 
risk ratings or Morningstar investment rankings.112  This systematic 
mimicry is deliberate and intended to attract investment through the 
strategic use of language, institutions, and metrics that are familiar 
to investors, like banks, debt instruments, and stars.113   
Seen in this light, IRIS and GIIRS are designed to facilitate the 
conversion of conventional investors into impact investors.  
However, as I have explained elsewhere, these tools have serious 
deficiencies.  Specifically, they fail actually to capture impact.114  
Impact is defined as an improvement to a person’s life or a social 
outcome caused by an intervention above and beyond what is 
                                                     
108 EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20. 
109 For a detailed explanation of Social Impact Bonds, see Deborah Burand, 
Globalizing Social Finance: How Social Impact Bonds and Social Impact Performance 
Guarantees Can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 447 (2013), available at 
http://www.nyujlb.org/wp-content/uploads/nyb_9-2_447-502_Burand.pdf.  
110 BIG SOCIETY CAPITAL, http://www.bigsocietycapital.com (last visited Mar. 
1, 2015). 
111 Id. 
112 Global Impact Investing, supra note 106. 
113 Tom Stabile, Architects of a ‘Social Investment Data Engine,’ FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Apr.  10, 2010; see also Margot Brandenburg & Sarah Gelfand, Impact Reporting and 
Investment Standards—Comment Now!, NEXT BILLION (Nov.  2, 2009), 
http://nextbillion.net/blogpost.aspx?blogid=1585 (explaining the reporting 
standards for impact investing). 
114 Id. at 423–24. 
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attributable to other factors.115  Thus, when it comes to assessing 
actual impact, the question is:  What would have happened to a 
person who participated in a program (taking a micro-loan, for 
instance) if they had not done so?  While this question may seem 
simple, drawing a causal relationship between an intervention and 
a social outcome is a fraught, expensive, and imprecise process; as a 
result, most measurement tools fall short of actually measuring 
impact.116  In balancing “the need for rigorous impact evaluation 
against the need for simple, cost effective ways” of measuring social 
impact, “[m]any impact investors . . . settle for measuring ‘activities’ 
or ‘outputs’ (such as the number of bednets sold) rather than 
running control groups to measure the ‘impact’.”117   
IRIS and GIIRS measure proxies for impact, meaning outputs 
(e.g., the number of jobs created or clean cooking stoves sold or the 
lifespan of a water filtration device).118  Similarly, rather than 
evaluating the substantive feedback from the individuals who are 
supposed to benefit from the services of a social business, IRIS and 
GIIRS would only ask whether such feedback is sought and through 
which mechanisms (e.g., annual stakeholder meetings or 
anonymous surveys).  The problem is that if information is limited 
to proxies, it becomes difficult to determine whether a social 
investment is in fact having a social impact.  Conversely, it becomes 
difficult to determine whether a particular positive (or negative) 
social outcome can be attributed to a particular social investment.   
As Morduch observes, rather than learning about the true 
impact of an intervention, readers of IRIS reports “get numbers on 
scale, outreach, costs, and revenues,” and proxies that are too 
                                                     
115 Syed Hashemi, Beyond Good Intentions: Measuring the Social Performance of 
Microfinance Institutions, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR at 3 (May 2007), 
available at https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-
Beyond-Good-Intentions-Measuring-the-Social-Performance-of-Microfinance-
Institutions-May-2007.pdf. 
116 Paul Brest & Kelly Born, Unpacking the Impact in Impact Investing, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., Aug. 14, 2013 [hereinafter Brest], available at 
http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/unpacking_the_impact_in_impact_inv
esting. 
117 See EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 72. 
118 Jonathan Morduch, Not So Fast: The Realities of Impact Investing, AMERICAS 
Q., Fall 2013, at 4 available at https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/ 
Morduch_-_The_Realities_of_Impact_Investing_-_Americas_Quarterly_2011.pdf 
[hereinafter Morduch]. 
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abstracted from the experience of beneficiaries to be useful.119  He 
cautions that “[i]f impact investing is to evolve as a mature 
development strategy, investors need to find ways to measure (and 
be accountable for) true net impacts.”120  Yet, precisely because they 
are charged with telling an ROI story that is accessible to a wide 
range of investors, social performance metrics compromise on the 
task of telling a complete and accurate story about social impact.  
The proxy issue is compounded by the limited capacity of 
quantitative tools to measure the experience of beneficiaries in the 
form of greater “empowerment, tolerance, authenticity, solidarity, 
and caring.”121   
It bears noting that the proxy problem is by no means isolated to 
the social finance space.  Public assistance programs, international 
development programs, philanthropic and civil society initiatives 
frequently have difficulty with the question of how to properly 
assess the social outcomes of their work.122  Even in these settings, 
the pressure to quantify impact and to rely on (not-necessarily-
reliable) metrics produces a range of perverse effects, including 
steering funds toward businesses and projects that “score” well, 
even if they don’t meaningfully improve lives.  Such perversions are 
troubling in the social provisioning sphere, writ large; however, 
there is something particularly unsettling about an entire market 
being built on the fiction that one can treat social impact like a 
commodity that can be invested in, produced, exchanged, and 
whose “value” can be quantitatively captured. 
Though the developers of IRIS and GIIRS recognize these 
limitations, their general response is that “the perfect is the enemy 
of the good” and that these tools are so vital to the growth of the 
impact investing market that the industry cannot afford to wait for 
perfection; instead, they should be put to use now and improved 
                                                     
119 Id. 
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121 Edwards, supra note 29, at 542. 
122 See generally Andrew Natsios, The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and 
Development, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV (2010), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1424271_file_Natsios_Counterbureau
cracy.pdf; see also Esther Duflo & Michael Kremer, Use of Randomization in the 
Evaluation of Development Effectiveness (2003), available at 
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ENGLE MERRY, Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY 
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eds., 2012).  
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down the line with the benefit of experience.123  While this response 
is understandable and, no doubt, well intentioned, for this author, it 
makes little sense to rate or assess the social impact of a business 
without taking the feedback from those whose lives are supposed to 
be positively impact-ed into account.   
Admittedly, there is no easy (or cheap) solution for improving 
social impact metrics, especially given that the beneficiaries 
themselves are heterogeneous and may bring conflicting interests 
into play.  However, as suggested in an earlier piece, one 
recommendation would be to supplement the quantitative proxy-
based information with qualitative information that captures 
something closer to beneficiaries’ lived experience of social 
finance.124  Such information could be collected in the form of 
interviews with beneficiaries or through feedback mechanisms (e.g., 
using texting to survey beneficiaries or register 
complaints/compliments).125  The information collected would, of 
course, need to be standardized for reporting purposes, but this 
process should stay true to the goal of (heavily) counting beneficiary 
experiences towards the assessment of social business’ performance.  
Additionally, beneficiaries should, whenever possible, be directly 
involved and consulted in developing impact assessment metrics, so 
that it becomes clearer what positive impact looks like from their 
perspective, rather than that of a business or a removed third-party 
standard setter (e.g., B Lab, which developed GIIRS).126  Such 
beneficiary-focused initiatives would paint a fuller, if not perfectly 
reflective, picture of the impact actually generated by impact 
investments.   
This overview of social impact metrics shows that there are 
serious problems with converting tools that were built for 
conventional finance into tools for social finance.  These limitations 
are evident with metrics, but they also extend beyond to include 
institutions like SSEs.  Conventional finance is not built to 
accommodate social concerns to the degree demanded by social 
finance and its beneficiaries.  Administrative institutions like SSEs 
                                                     
123 Global Impact Investing Rating System, Q1 2011 Progress Report: Impact 
Investing: Challenges and Opportunities to Scale (2011), available at 
https://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/G
IIRS_2011-Progress-Report.pdf.  
124 See Dadush, supra note 101, at 402-11.  
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must therefore take on the difficult task of making deep adjustments 
to the conventional blueprint to support a healthy market for 
impact. 
Hybridity is multi-dimensional, pervasive, and intrinsic to social 
finance.  It is at once the most compelling and the most dangerous 
feature of this new industry.  Compelling because it embodies the 
promise of social finance, to change the way that companies do 
business, and make the world a better place.  Dangerous because it 
is built upon a tense merger between two historically opposed 
imperatives that can clash in a way that critically compromises the 
anti-poverty and social development missions of impact 
investments.127  Profit and social good are not natural bedfellows, 
and, at the risk of taking the metaphor too far, simply covering them 
with the same sheet does not guarantee that they will not kick each 
other in their sleep.  As cautioned in a catalytic study on impact 
investing by JP Morgan, “it would be naïve to believe that these two 
imperatives are never in tension.”128   
Some commentators go further and identify a tradeoff between 
the two:  “Accomplishing either of these objectives makes the other 
more difficult to achieve, placing the dual goals in tension.”129  To 
illustrate the tradeoff argument, consider the example of 
microfinance.  Recall that the interest rates charged on MFI loans are 
on average very high, with some in excess of 100 percent.  As 
observed in a CGAP130 Focus Note, “[e]ven people who favor a 
commercial approach to most microfinance have to scratch their 
heads when they see shareholders making annual returns of 100 
percent on their investments, compounded for eight years 
running.”131  Head scratching makes sense when one identifies the 
source of profits, namely, the poor.  Simply put, when interest rates 
are higher than needed to cover expenses, MFI shareholders profit.  
                                                     
127 Arena, supra note 41, at 276. 
128 EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 67. 
129 Arena, supra note 41, at 274. 
130 See Richard Rosenberg, CGAP Reflection on the Compartamos Initial Public    
Offering: A Case Study on Microfinance Interest Rates and Profit, CGAP (June 2007), 
https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-CGAP-
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The ethical rub is that it is the micro-borrowers, or the Customer-
Beneficiaries of microfinance, who pay the interest that is then 
converted into profit for MFI owners.  The conversion of need into 
profit can be discomforting, especially if revenues greatly exceed 
costs.  Yet, it is entirely consistent with the workings of hybridity.   
Social finance aims to advance the interests of both businesses 
and beneficiaries, but it is not difficult to imagine how the interests 
of businesses might be advanced at the expense of beneficiaries:  
“higher charges to borrowers correlate directly with higher profits 
captured by investors . . . there is a direct and obvious conflict 
between the welfare of clients and the welfare of investors.”132  
While it may be acceptable to profit from customers in this way in a 
conventional commercial context, the acceptability gauge shifts in 
light of the promises made by social finance. 
 
3.3.  Mission Drift and the Dangers of Commercialization 
 
Social-Financial hybridity is the source of mission drift, when 
profit seeking is prioritized over the social mission to the detriment 
of the latter.  Mission drift can take various forms:  “In pursuit of 
more profit, a business may be inclined to target relatively better-off 
customers, raise prices to take advantage of the lack of competition 
often encountered in underserved markets, or take cash out of the 
business rather than reinvest in innovation to enable even broader 
customer reach.”133  Thus, mission drift can manifest in changes to 
the customer base of a social business, so that the customers who 
cost more to serve become sidelined, even when they formed the 
original target group, and even though they remain grossly under-
served by conventional market providers.  Alternatively, the 
programmatic focus of the business can shift to activities that 
generate greater financial revenue, rather than social benefit.134  The 
                                                     
132 Id. at 10. 
133 EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 67. 
134 See HOMI KHARAS & ANDREW ROGERSON, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., HORIZON 
2025: CREATIVE DESTRUCTION IN THE AID INDUSTRY 20 (2012), available at http://www. 
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costs of this type of mission drift are born primarily by Customer-
Beneficiaries.   
Mission drift can also result in revenue being deployed to 
increase executive compensation or investor dividends, rather than 
to expand access to the service or good being provided.135  This type 
of mission drift affects both Customer-Beneficiaries and Worker-
Beneficiaries, but can be particularly harmful to the latter.  Worker-
Beneficiaries employed by a social business that is drifting from its 
mission could, for example, see a contraction of the skills-building 
component of their employment, or be locked into a relatively low 
wage—ostensibly to subsidize capacity building programs—even 
when resources are available to increase salaries or benefits. 
In its most acute form, mission drift can harm the very people 
who are supposed to benefit from social finance.  This was seen in 
the microfinance crisis that seized the Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh in 2010, sending ripples of alarm across the microfinance 
industry globally.136  As explained, MFIs embody hybridity through 
the simultaneous pursuit of a strong social mission and a strong 
financial mission.  Seeking to grow operations and reach more 
borrowers, some MFIs have embarked on a commercialization 
trajectory that fundamentally changes their financing structures.  
This means that they have seen their financing evolve from 
philanthropic grants to interest-bearing loans to equity 
investments.137  For example, SKS, one of the largest MFIs in India, 
was originally founded on a mission to eradicate poverty as a non-
                                                     
135 Morduch, supra note 118. 
136 See CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR, ANDHRA PRADESH 2010: GLOBAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS IN INDIAN MICROFINANCE 5 (2010) [hereinafter GLOBAL 
IMPLICATIONS], available at https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-
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137 See generally RICHARD ROSENBERG, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR, 
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profit organization financed with grant money.138  It later received 
loan financing from both public and private lenders, and eventually 
re-incorporated as a for-profit, which allowed it to bring in equity 
investment.139  In 2010, SKS achieved the final milestone of 
commercialization by becoming a publicly listed company:  It had a 
hugely successful Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange in which its shares were over thirteen times 
oversubscribed.140  
At each step in the commercialization process, the pressure to 
prioritize profit over the social mission increases.  This is 
particularly true if corporate control shifts to owners who are less 
committed to the social mission than the original owner-founders.141  
In the case of SKS, commercialization led to a re-prioritizing of the 
MFI’s objectives, with growth becoming paramount.  In the lead-up 
to the IPO, SKS management endeavored to increase profit in order 
to drive up the value of its soon-to-be-public shares.  Lending was 
quickly and significantly expanded, in part by cutting corners on the 
due diligence processes for screening borrowers.  Loosening the due 
diligence standards led to a practice of over-lending to individuals 
who could not afford to service their debt.  Arena describes this as 
the “debt trap” form of mission drift, where “the drive to achieve 
large volumes of loans (ensuring high aggregate returns) leads the 
MFI to extend loans unethically or irresponsibly to clients who 
cannot actually afford them.”142   
Added to this, when borrowers (unsurprisingly) defaulted on 
loan payments, SKS’s loan officers, whose salaries and commissions 
were tied to the volume and performance of their loans,143 
                                                     
138 FAQ’s, SKS MICROFINANCE, http://www.sksindia.com/faq.php (last 
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142 Arena, supra note 41, at 276.  See also, Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights 
Approach to Consumer Credit, TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (analyzing how lending 
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reportedly employed coercive debt collection practices to shame 
defaulting borrowers into paying.144  The combination of over-
lending, inability to repay, and shaming practices—which was not 
unique to SKS—has been blamed for a tragic wave of borrower 
suicides in 2010.145  The chairman of India’s Microfinance 
Institutions Network reacted, saying that “multiple lending, over-
indebtedness, coercive recovery practices and unseemly enrichment 
by promoters and senior executives [of micro-credit companies] has 
led to this situation.”146   
The events in Andhra Pradesh provide an alarming illustration 
of the effects that mission drift and commercialization can have on 
social businesses that transact with the poor.147  In an ironic twist, it 
is precisely when social businesses become successful enough to 
commercialize that mission drift can creep in and create cracks in 
the social goods supply chain through which beneficiaries can slip.  
Indeed, episodes such as the one in Andhra Pradesh give flesh to the 
concern that entities that serve marginalized populations can lose 
                                                     
volumes, with insufficient incentives for sound underwriting and customer care.”). 
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Epidemic, BBC NEWS, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
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sight of their social mission when competing commercial interests 
come into play.148    
In early 2011, Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, the 
celebrated microfinance pioneer, wrote an op-ed for the New York 
Times:   
I never imagined that one day microcredit would give rise to 
its own breed of loan sharks.  But it has.  And as a result, 
many borrowers in India have been defaulting on their 
microloans, which could then result in lenders being driven 
out of business.  India’s crisis points to a clear need to get 
microcredit back on track.149 
Yunus blames the turn of microfinance away from the interests 
of the poor on commercialization:  “Commercialization has been a 
terrible wrong turn for microfinance, and it indicates a worrying 
‘mission drift’ in the motivation of those lending to the poor.  
Poverty should be eradicated, not seen as a money-making 
opportunity.”150   
Yunus opposed the SKS IPO, voicing the concern that for-profit 
MFIs would inevitably engage in predatory lending practices, “one 
of the very things which microfinance ought to protect the poor 
against.”151  This critique hits at the heart of the concern with 
adopting market-based solutions to solve social problems.  Indeed, 
SKS’s drastic departure from its social mission led “many observers 
to question whether social problems . . . can be solved through 
strategies that also produce revenue.”152  Yunus’s view is that “[y]ou 
will never see the situation of poor people if you look at it through 
the glasses of profit-making.”153  As explained above, the 
ramifications of mission drift are amplified when individuals living 
at the BoP are affected, precisely because their financial cushion is 
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so thin:  “the consequences of a business exploiting its customers can 
be particularly devastating, given how little they have.”154   
Given that microfinance is among the more established strands 
of social finance, it is not surprising that it is also among the first to 
materialize this particular type of market failure.  As Jonathan 
Morduch warns, we must learn from India’s microfinance 
experience and mitigate the risks of social harm that come with 
commercialization:   
The investors surely had good intentions and social 
commitments, but balance was lost.  There’s often good 
reason to think that impact investments can bring a world of 
good, but it’s dangerous to ignore the flip side of the coin.  
There are times when investors can help turn something 
good into something risky for customers, as in India.155   
To summarize, mission drift is a product of the tensions 
involved with hybridity, tensions that are aggravated by 
commercialization.  When mission drift occurs, the social gets 
squeezed out of social finance.  Clearly, therefore, hybridity must be 
regulated.  This is a complex project for both public and private 
regulators to undertake, but a necessary one given the vulnerability 
of social finance beneficiaries.156  Hybridity constitutes a pressing 
regulatory challenge.  It is morally pressing because it creates 
opportunities for exploitation and abuse under the guise of 
promoting market-based solutions to improve lives.  It is also 
pressing time-wise because social finance is still in the market 
building stage.  This means that whatever definitions, standards, 
rules, and enforcement mechanisms are developed today will 
fundamentally shape this fast-growing space for years to come.  
Such norms can quickly become entrenched and difficult to change.  
SSEs are well positioned to play a significant role in this norm-
setting process.  The next Parts consider how effective SSEs, as 
currently designed, are likely to be in performing this important 
regulatory function. 
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4.  SSES AS REGULATORS 157 
 
Today, social finance, and more specifically, the investors and 
businesses operating within this space, are generally under-
regulated.  In practical terms, this means that we lack regulatory 
tools for effectively differentiating social impact investors or social 
businesses from their respective conventional counterparts in a 
systematic or consistent way.  Yet, unless these differences are 
drawn in a meaningful and workable fashion, there is little reason 
to expect that social finance will amount to much beyond an esthetic 
enhancement of the existing business and finance landscapes.  In the 
worst case, social finance could actually make a negative 
contribution to social welfare.  Significant rulemaking needs to take 
place for this regulatory vacuum to be filled.   
As platforms for connecting impact investors, social businesses, 
and, less directly, beneficiaries, SSEs are well positioned to take on 
at least some of this work.  Though still in their infancy, SSEs are 
useful to study for three main reasons:  First, a central function of 
SSEs is to help social businesses commercialize their financing so 
that they can scale up operations and break their dependency on 
grant funding.  As explained in the last Part, this launches SSEs into 
troubled waters, where the risk of mission drift is most acute.  
Tracking the development of SSE “law” with respect to mission drift 
can help to identify mechanisms for regulating hybridity and 
commercializing social solutions in a way that is safe and 
sustainable. 
Second, SSEs ostensibly do the actual work of differentiating 
social from conventional finance by creating a separate marketplace 
for impact investments.  SSEs can achieve this by developing specific 
listing criteria for social businesses wishing to transact on their 
platform; establishing requirements with which listed businesses 
must comply in order to stay listed, such as the production of 
financial and social reports; formulating and implementing rules 
and standards to govern social finance transactions, such as 
requiring a minimum investment duration, for example; putting in 
place investor-screens to ensure that the “right” kinds of investors 
access the platform; and, last but not least, setting up the 
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mechanisms for enforcing all of these rules, such as clear de-listing 
conditions and accessible grievance mechanisms.  All of this 
rulemaking work can make a huge contribution to the crucial 
regulatory project of concretely differentiating the social finance 
space from its conventional counterpart.   
Even if SSEs never become major players in international capital 
markets or never manage to transform impact investing into a 
mainstream type of investment, the rules and norms that they 
release into the world matter for understanding how to go about 
regulating social finance.  Furthermore, by providing a venue for 
social businesses and investors to “meet,” SSEs not only create but 
also structure the relationships between these stakeholders, and, less 
directly but no less importantly, the beneficiaries.  From a regulatory 
perspective, this means that SSEs could create important lines of 
accountability between the key social finance stakeholders—another 
big contribution to the regulatory project.   
Third, SSEs are self-regulated to the extent that the rules they 
create and implement among their members—listed businesses and 
investors—are not being “fed” to them by an official government 
regulator.  This is particularly true of the SSE-developed rules 
pertaining to social impact securities, since regulations already exist 
for conventional securities.  We can therefore expect that SSE 
accountability will largely come from the social finance market 
itself, meaning the existing and potential users of the platforms.  
Because their survival depends on market appeal, SSEs can help us 
to better grasp the opportunities and limitations of self-regulation.  
More specifically, the study of SSEs allows us to see what can be 
done with the opportunity to design and curate rules for 
administering a new market, and how that opportunity might be 
constrained by that very market and the interests operating within 
it.  This process should be of particular interest to lawyers who want 
to understand how rules can make (or not) a positive difference in 
the world. 
 
4.1.  Transnational Rulemaking Laboratories 
 
Just as CSEs did for conventional finance, SSEs are well 
positioned to adopt and develop rules and standards for regulating 
social finance.  Historically, securities regulation was an entirely 
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private affair managed by self-regulated stock exchanges.  Stock 
exchanges were themselves conceived as private bodies or clubs.158  
For example, the London Stock Exchange traces its roots back to the 
bowels of a coffee shop called Jonathan’s Coffee House in the 18th 
century.159  Jonathan’s was transformed into a private trading club 
that regulated membership, access to the physical premises, and the 
transactions in which members engaged.160  Today, the securities 
field retains a strong self-regulating dimension, even though 
government is much more involved.161   
In the U.S., for example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), the agency charged with enforcing federal 
securities law, delegates many regulatory responsibilities to self-
regulating organizations (“SROs”).  SROs are private institutions 
that establish, monitor compliance with, and enforce rules 
applicable to securities markets and the conduct of market 
participants.162  They include exchanges like the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASDAQ.  The Securities Act of 1934 
requires that the SEC recognizes SROs and that SROs “regulate their 
members with both their own rules and federal securities laws.”163  
In the U.S., as in many other jurisdictions, CSEs are responsible for 
developing and ensuring compliance with exchange-specific rules, 
as well as with public legislation.164  Thus, exchanges have 
significant rulemaking power and discretion, particularly for new or 
specialized markets.   
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that private exchanges were the sole rule-makers for securities regulation and that 
they were privately regulated in the U.K. until 1986); see also John Carson, Self-
Regulation in Securities Markets (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 5542, 2011), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/ 
WPS5542_Self_Regulation_in_Securities_Markets.pdf [hereinafter Carson]; Adam 
C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets 32-39 (Univ. of Mich.  Ctr.  For 
Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 02-008, 2003), http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm [hereinafter Pritchard]. 
162 Carson, supra note 161, at 5. 
163 Id. at 6. 
164 Id. 
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This background explains why SSEs can expect to enjoy 
independence as rule-makers for social finance, in particular when 
it comes to developing rules to regulate social-financial hybridity.  
Today, securities regulation is not granular enough to properly 
address the distinctive hybridity-related requirements of social 
finance.  SSEs can therefore be described as operating like 
“rulemaking laboratories” that develop and test regulations for an 
under-governed space.  They are poised to follow in CSEs’ 
regulatory footsteps and do the regulatory legwork of formulating, 
mainstreaming, and implementing rules and standards for social 
finance.  Though SSE law will initially be limited in application to 
SSE members and invite only voluntary compliance, this could 
change as it did when CSE-developed rules became formalized as 
official, publicly enforceable, securities regulation.   
SSEs can be described as “transnational” rulemaking 
laboratories because they develop norms that exceed the legal 
jurisdictions for which they were developed.165  For example, the 
SVX model is currently being replicated outside of Canada, in the 
U.S. and in Mexico.166  SSEs also keep track of each other’s progress 
and experience.167  Thus, the lessons learned and practices 
developed by the U.K.’s SSX could influence those adopted by the 
Singapore-Mauritius IX, for example.  Furthermore, as suggested 
just above, the dissemination of SSE law isn’t limited to SSEs or even 
to private actors.  Indeed, the standards adopted by SVX, which is 
based in Canada’s Ontario Province, could influence government 
regulators at the provincial and the national level.  In fact, SVX is 
                                                     
165 See Greg Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE, (Ed. Gregory Shaffer, 2013) 
(explaining that “the concept of transnational law has been developed to address 
legal norms that do not clearly fall within traditional conceptions of national and 
international law but are not necessarily global in nature,” and highlighting the 
limitations of state-centric theories of public and private international law as 
compared with the concept of “transnational legal orders” for capturing the 
processes underlying the “construction, flow, and impact of transnational legal 
norms”); see also Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Kirsch and Richard Stewart, The 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) 
(developing a framework for understanding the formation and administration of 
transnational orders that shape and are shaped by the conduct of state and non-
state actors). 
166 Adam Spence, SVX Scaling Social Innovation Across Borders, (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://socialfinance.ca/2014/11/18/svx-scaling-social-innovation-across-
borders/.   
167 Interview with Adam Spence, SVX Founder, (July 24, 2015).  
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working to carve out an exception under Ontario securities law to 
allow non-accredited investors to transact on its platform.168   
SSE rulemaking could also inform the content of public law in 
other countries where regulators have been tasked with upgrading 
social enterprise or social disclosure laws, for example.  It is not 
difficult to imagine a “transplant”169 of the SSE legal ordering 
framework to a developing country whose social businesses are 
listed on the Singapore-Mauritius IX in East Asia and Africa, for 
example, as these countries may lack resources to develop new law.  
Indeed, an important distinction between private regulation and 
official regulation is that the former are not limited to a particular 
legal jurisdiction.  This can be advantageous, especially when it 
comes to shaping and governing new markets. 
While SSEs may have discretion to develop rules pertaining to 
the social dimension of social finance, they and the businesses they 
list must nevertheless comply with applicable securities regulation 
and corporate law.  In other words, even though SSEs are private 
platforms with significant rulemaking powers, they are not 
themselves completely unregulated.  SSE platforms must comply 
with applicable securities laws, in other words.  Coming back to the 
SVX example, to date, non-accredited investors as defined under 
Ontario securities law are not allowed to transact on that platform; 
this restriction is imposed by law, not SVX.  Similarly, in order to 
list, companies must show that they are in compliance with 
applicable securities laws and that they are in good corporate 
standing. 
SSEs can be described as transnational rulemaking laboratories 
because the law they produce can travel within the social finance 
market and across borders to reach both public and private rule-
makers.  And, as in the earlier discussion concerning the 
formalization of new corporate forms and private certification 
schemes, it is important not to confuse the private and voluntary 
features of self-regulation and the absence of legal enforcement with 
                                                     
168 Spence, supra note 166.  
169 See generally KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1960-1995, 47 (1999); 
Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The          
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA.J. INT’L ECON.L. 791, 
794-95 (2002); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, Chapter 25: Modelling,                 
Globalization and the Politics of Empowerment, in GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION, 578-
602 (2000). 
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lack of regulatory power.  The history of securities regulation 
demonstrates that government takes many of its regulatory cues 
from private rule-makers, particularly when dealing with new 
markets.170  It also demonstrates that private actors have strong 
incentives to comply with rules that enable them to do business 
more efficiently, even when those rules are not officially enforceable.  
In other words, when the benefits of voluntary compliance exceed 
the costs—which can include market exclusion—private ordering 
regimes can be just as effective as official regulation.171  
 
4.2.  Regulating Through Stock Exchanges:  Why the Why Matters 
 
CSEs rely on three main devices to administer financial 
regulation: listing requirements, corporate governance and 
disclosure requirements, and enforcement or de-listing 
mechanisms.172  All of these devices apply to CSE issuers and are 
designed to protect the interests of investors by correcting 
information asymmetries in order to prevent fraud, better inform 
investor decision-making, and promote competition.173  They are 
each replicated by SSEs, as described below.  A central argument 
here is that, while some replication is necessary and desirable, SSEs 
must carefully tailor the devices they employ to effectively regulate 
against mission drift and protect beneficiary interests.  If they are to 
meet the hybridity challenge, in other words, SSEs will need to 
adjust and devise new mechanisms that are especially designed to 
mitigate the risks of mission drift and to take into account the needs 
                                                     
170 See generally WALTER MATLLI & TIM BUTHE, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (providing a detailed 
account of the adoption of private rules for financial reporting by public bodies); 
see also Claire Kelley & Roberta Karmell, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities        
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 884-85 (2009) (explaining how U.S. securities 
laws are shaped by private standards and rules). 
171 See Carson, supra note 161, at 9 (explaining that while exchange membership 
may be voluntary, as a practical matter, it is “essential to carry on securities 
business”); see also Davis & Gelpern, supra note 156, at 1255-57 and 1265-66 
(describing the virtues and limitations of private ordering).   
172 Hans Christiansen & Alissa Kolderstova, The Role of Stock Exchanges in 
Corporate Governance, OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, 4 (2008). 
173 See generally Stephen Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing 
Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1694-95 (2001-2002). 
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and vulnerabilities of Customer-Beneficiaries and Worker-
Beneficiaries.   
This means that it will not be sufficient for SSEs simply to 
“blueprint” the CSE regulatory model.174  Instead, to create a truly 
social stock exchange, SSEs must take every opportunity to adjust 
the CSE blueprint and to inject it with beneficiary protections.  It is 
on this basis that SSE success should be evaluated.  Drawing new 
investors and capital into the social problem-solving space is of 
course an important mark of SSE success, as well.  However, unless 
beneficiary interests feature centrally in the legal order that SSEs 
establish, these new regulators will have only partially succeeded in 
truly differentiating social from conventional finance.    
Securities regulation in conventional markets is intended to 
protect the interests of investors above all and this requires trust.  As 
Pritchard observes,  
[s]ecurities markets cannot operate without trust.  Investors 
can trust in exchanges to regulate because of their powerful 
incentive to maximize trading volume.  The many choices 
that investors have today remind exchanges that investor 
protection is a crucial part of their business.  Investors will 
leave markets that fail to protect investors to find markets 
that will.175   
The beneficiaries of CSE regulation and conventional securities 
regulation are the investors.  While a well-functioning market is 
considered a “public good,” the actual public, meaning the 
investment-affected communities, are distant secondary 
beneficiaries of securities regulation as compared with investors.176  
                                                     
174 The International Securities Commissions Organization (IOSCO) explains 
that “[t]he broad objectives of self-regulation are the same as those identified for 
government regulation of financial markets . . . to preserve market integrity . . . to 
preserve financial integrity . . . and to protect investors.” IOSCO SRO CONSULTATIVE 
COMMITTEE, MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION, at 2 (2000), available at http:// 
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD110.pdf.  Accordingly, the SEC’s 
stated mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 
and facilitate capital formation.” The Investors Advocate: How the SEC Protects 
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S.  SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo. shtml#.VNPxVFXF9so.  
175 Pritchard, supra note 161, at 39.   
176 IOSCO Technical Committee, Issues Paper on Exchange Demutualization, 
at 4, 10 (2000), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD119.pdf; see also IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, CONSULTATION REPORT: 
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In the conventional context, investors are the consumers, not the 
subjects of regulation, which explains why very few rules govern 
investor conduct.  The “why” of SSEs—to create platforms for 
improving lives and the health of the planet—is fundamentally 
different from the why of CSEs, and that difference should feature 
centrally in SSE design.  An important measure of SSE regulatory 
success will therefore be how well their rules protect that social 
difference, or how well they protect the interests of beneficiaries, 
alongside those of investors.   
 
5.  THREE NEW KIDS ON THE REGULATORY BLOCK:                              
SSX, SVX, AND IX 
 
The three SSEs discussed in this sub-section are still very new, 
having emerged only in 2013.  This review is therefore necessarily 
preliminary, as these platforms are likely to evolve substantially in 
the next few years.  Some key features can nevertheless be identified 
and initial assessments are made concerning the likelihood of 
regulatory success.  For each SSE, we report on the purpose or 
mission of the platform, its regulatory status, the devices employed 
to regulate social business issuers (listing requirements, reporting 
and corporate governance requirements, and enforcement 
mechanisms), and any devices employed to regulate investors.  
At the outset, it bears noting that none of these platforms is yet 
trading in impact securities per se.  Though it calls itself an SSE, the 
U.K.’s SSX is an information portal that provides investors with 
details about the social impact of businesses that are listed on 
conventional exchanges.  SVX in Canada is a private placement 
platform that connects investors with social businesses and enables 
them to transact, but as yet there is no secondary market for trading 
in the resulting impact securities.  Finally, the Impact Exchange (IX) 
of Mauritius (designed in Singapore) is most similar to a CSE in that 
it will eventually be possible for social businesses to sell shares on 
                                                     
REGULATORY ISSUES ARISING FROM EXCHANGE EVOLUTION, at 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD212.pdf (“The fair and 
efficient functioning of an exchange is of significant benefit to the public.  The 
efficiency of the secondary market . . . facilitates efficient raising of capital for 
commercial enterprises, benefiting both the wider corporate sector and the 
economy as a whole.”). 
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the exchange, and for those shares to be traded on the secondary 
market, but this has yet to happen.  
 
 
 
 
5.1.  The Social Stock Exchange (SSX), United Kingdom 
 
5.1.1.  The mission 
 
On June 6, 2013, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron announced 
the launch of the SSX during the Social Impact Investment Forum, 
which was held just prior to the G8 summit:  
We need a robust way of . . . connecting businesses that 
deliver social and environmental value with investors 
seeking both a social and a financial return.  So I am 
absolutely delighted that today the London Stock Exchange 
is supporting the launch of the world’s first Social Stock 
Exchange, an online portal that will become the first 
information platform on the planet to showcase publicly 
listed social impact businesses.177   
SSX seeks to increase the visibility of social businesses among 
the investment community and “to create an efficient, universally 
accessible buyers’ and sellers’ marketplace where impact investors 
and social impact businesses of all sizes can achieve greater impact 
either through capital allocation or capital raising.” 178  It further 
intends to “bridge the gap between the increasing desire of 
businesses to make a difference alongside making a profit, and those 
investors who share this vision and have the means to enable it to 
be fulfilled.”179  SSX’s mission reveals a clear emphasis on capital 
raising and drawing investors into the social finance space. 
                                                     
177 Cameron Speech supra note 1; see also FAQs, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, 
http://www.socialstockexchange.com/faqs (last visited Mar. 2, 2015); Troilo, supra 
note 36. 
178 Our Mission, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.com/ 
our-mission-history/. 
179 Id. 
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When it comes to marketing itself to potential members, SSX 
mentions the following advantages:  
Your company will be identified as a leading organisation 
delivering social or environmental impact through core 
business activities.  Your company will be able to capitalise 
on the growing momentum around social impact 
investment.  The core social and environmental aims of your 
business will become more transparent and visible, and 
ultimately more quantifiable and rewarded.  You will benefit 
from a wide range of targeted marketing and 
communication programmes aimed at impact investors.180  
To fulfill its mission, SSX must address some of the problems 
that impair the growth of social finance, in particular the “lack of 
consistent data and regulation, the need for mission-oriented 
businesses to gain greater visibility, and a scarcity of mature 
enterprises to absorb available capital from interested impact 
investors, all of which lead to low investor confidence.”181  SSX can 
therefore be described as performing a two-pronged regulatory 
function:  To create a rules-based, informationally rich and 
transparent platform that can draw investors into the social finance 
space and stimulate social business activity, and, as a necessary 
corollary, build up investor trust.   
 
5.1.2.  Trading and official oversight 
 
SSX is not an actual trading platform.  It is more accurately 
described as an information portal that investors can access to learn 
about impact investing opportunities:  It “does not facilitate share 
trading but serves as a directory and research service for would-be 
social impact investors.”182  The companies listed on SSX must 
                                                     
180 Become a Member, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange. 
com/become-a-member/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
181 Evan Weaver, Marrying cash and change: Social ‘stock markets’ spread 
worldwide, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug.  30, 2012), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Making-a-difference/Change-Agent/2012/ 
0830/Marrying-cash-and-change-Social-stock-markets-spread-worldwide 
[hereinafter Weaver]. 
182 Vanessa Kortekaas & Ruth Sullivan U.K.’s, Social Stock Exchange Set to            
Include International Members, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Kortekaas & 
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already be publicly traded companies on a CSE and therefore trade 
in whatever securities are permitted under their CSE’s rules.  The 
SSX is therefore “not for start-ups – it’s for more mature companies 
that need to raise significant amounts of money for growth and 
expansion.”183   
Currently, the SSX lists 14 social impact businesses working in 
diverse areas: One company manufactures and licenses 
environmentally sustainable building materials; another is a 
developer of affordable housing that supports community health 
and social care services in the U.K.; another specializes in healthcare 
property and ensuring compliance with the recently enacted Health 
and Social Care Act; yet another, headquartered in the U.S. 
specializes in water purification technologies that are sold through 
partner distribution companies in the Asia Pacific region, Central 
and South America, and in the U.S.  About 14 more companies are 
currently under review for admission by the members of the SSX 
Admissions Panel.   
The SSX is open to companies headquartered outside the U.K., 
meaning that issuers can be incorporated in any jurisdiction, so long 
as they qualify to list on the SSE.  As concerns official oversight, 
while SSX is supported by the London Stock Exchange, it is no part 
of the exchange.  The SSX is a standalone non-profit entity that is not 
regulated by an official body.  However, since businesses that list on 
the SSX must also be listed on a CSE, they will be subject to the rules 
of that CSE, including the CSE’s home-state legislation.  As 
discussed above, CSE rules pertain to conventional securities 
regulation, which is focused on financial performance.  As concerns 
social performance, SSX has broad rulemaking powers, and 
businesses must comply with SSX rules if they wish to list and stay 
listed.  
 
5.1.3. Regulating social businesses 
 
5.1.3.1.  Listing and governance requirements 
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183 Weaver, supra note 181; see generally Future Plans, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, 
http://socialstockexchange.com/future-plans/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
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As mentioned above, in order to be listed on the SSX, companies 
must already be listed on an SSX-approved CSE.184  Thus, only for-
profit companies can list on the SSX.  This is the first eligibility 
criterion.  The second is that the company must have “social or 
environmental impact as a core aim” (emphasis added—the mission 
does not have to be the core aim).185  To satisfy this requirement, 
companies must submit a Social Impact Report for review by the 
independent Admissions Panel composed of 11 finance and impact-
investing experts.  The Report must be drafted with the assistance of 
an approved, independent impact analyst.186  If the application is 
accepted, the company must pay an annual listing fee of £10, 000, 
unless waived.187   
As concerns corporate governance, applicants must commit to 
“transparency and disclosure around such issues as remuneration, 
tax and ownership, as well as key activities such as arms sales, 
pornography, bonded labour, child labour, tobacco, abuse of human 
rights or discriminatory employment practices.”188  Applicants must 
also disclose “any other reputational reason why your company 
should be admitted to the SSX.189  Presumably this includes 
disclosure of pending or prospective lawsuits.  While the SSX 
application requires applicants to affirm that they adhere to the UK 
Corporate Governance Guidelines, the latter contain no specific 
requirements concerning social corporate governance.  The focus is 
almost entirely financial.  For example, the Guidelines recommend 
only that “[t]he board and its committees should have the 
appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and 
knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their 
respective duties and responsibilities effectively.”190  These are 
                                                     
184 SSX APPLICATION FORM, http://socialstockexchange.com/membership/ 
business-register-part-3/ [hereinafter SSX APPLICATION FORM]. 
185 Become a Member, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange. 
com/become-member (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Become a Member]. 
186 Id.  
187 Kortekaas & Sullivan, supra note 182; see also SSX APPLICATION FORM, supra 
note 184.  
188 SSX APPLICATION FORM, supra note 184. 
189 Id. 
190 Financial Reporting Council, The U.K. Corporate Governance Code, The Main 
Principles of the Code: Effectiveness, 5 (Sept. 2014), available at https://www.frc. 
org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-2014.pdf. 
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vague terms of reference for the board members of a business with 
a social mission.   
Further, SSX does not provide additional specificity when it 
comes to defining directors' duties and responsibilities or skills.  
This means that the leadership of an SSX-listed business could lack 
the skills to advance or ensure compliance with the firm’s social 
mission.  In other words, aside from having a social (or an 
environmental) mission as a core aim, and “committing to” 
disclosing anti-social activities, the SSX governance requirements 
are not specific about how listed entities should fulfill their social 
promises.  As an independent rule-maker, SSX could do more to 
elucidate what good social corporate governance looks like.  For 
example, it could have required that applicants task a board member 
with monitoring compliance with the social mission and with 
identifying mechanisms to engage with beneficiaries. 
 
5.1.3.2.  Disclosure and reporting requirements 
 
To stay listed, SSX issuers must provide annual social impact 
reports that are made available on the website free of charge.191  
While the Admissions Panel is the body responsible for reviewing 
the initial report submitted with the application package, it is not 
clear if it is also responsible for reviewing the updated annual 
reports.  It is also not clear whether review and/or verification of the 
updated reports are required for continued listing.   
Unlike the financial disclosure rules implemented by CSEs, the 
SSX reporting rules do not require compliance with a particular set 
of standards or format, nor are listed entities required to report on a 
particular set of metrics.  Rather than relying on metrics to capture 
impact, SSX reports mostly contain prose descriptions of social 
performance.  As a result, SSX impact reports look different from 
business to business (e.g. they range from 9 to 28 pages).  Some 
guidance is provided as to the required content of annual reports, 
but mostly in broad strokes.  SSX reports must cover five themes: (1) 
The social or environmental purpose of the company and the impact 
it will deliver; (2) who benefits as a result of the company’s social 
impact; (3) how a company’s products, services, and operations 
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deliver impact; (4) how a company involves and consults with all of 
its stakeholders; (5) what evidence a company has of its social 
impact and how that evidence is collected, measured, and 
reported.192  
The lack of metrics and comparable data points for evaluating 
social performance could prove problematic for investors if it 
increases the cost of investigating investment opportunities.  
Otherwise put, SSX vets social businesses and centralizes impact 
information, which should reduce investor transaction costs, but 
costs could climb because the information collected is not easily 
comparable.  On the other hand, reporting on impact using prose 
rather than quantitative measures may be more protective of 
beneficiary interests.   
As explained earlier, the emphasis on metrification is 
problematic in the social finance context because social returns are 
not as easy to quantify or track as financial returns.  Investments that 
chase reportedly high SROI may not improve social welfare to the 
degree hoped for because of the difficulties involved with 
measuring actual impact, especially with proxies.  Thus, from a 
beneficiary perspective, impact prose may be more protective than 
numeric reporting.  In this regard, themes (2) and (4) are particularly 
important since they bring beneficiaries into the reporting fold and 
potentially create avenues for holding businesses accountable for 
their social promise.  However, by providing only general guidance 
on reporting, SSX under-utilizes this source of regulatory power.   
 
 5.1.4.  Enforcement mechanisms 
 
It appears that there are two circumstances under which a 
company’s membership to SSX could be suspended:  If it fails to 
submit an updated annual report and if its business model changes:  
As a member of the Social Stock Exchange, you will be 
required to update your Impact Report annually.  If your 
business model changes, such that you are no longer 
operating as a social impact business, your Social Stock 
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Exchange membership will be suspended pending any 
appeal you may wish to make.193 
 Very little detail is provided as to what constitutes a suspension-
worthy change to the business’s model.  Further, unless a listed 
entity declares to SSX that it has changed, the only way a departure 
from the mission could be detected is through a review of the 
updated annual impact report, which is concerning, since the 
thoroughness of the annual review process is not clear, as mentioned 
above.   
Other than a suspension based on a change to the business 
model and failure to report, the SSX does not appear to have 
mechanisms in place for ensuring compliance with its own rules.  
For example, neither investors nor beneficiaries can register 
complaints (or compliments) about a social business with the SSX.  
The combination of vague suspension criteria with limited recourse 
for holding businesses accountable, suggests that the enforcement 
mechanisms of the SSX are relatively weak.  Here again, SSX seems 
to under-utilize its regulatory power.  This may be because 
investment transactions take place on CSEs and not on SSX, but 
since CSEs do not deal with the social dimension of business 
conduct to the degree necessary to regulate against mission drift, 
SVX should use its powers in a more targeted fashion.  It could, for 
example, develop a framework for identifying conduct that 
constitutes a “social breach” by listed entities and design 
enforcement devices accordingly.      
 
 5.1.5.  Regulating investors 
 
The SSX does not differentiate between finance-first and impact-
first investors, meaning that all types of investors can access the 
platform.  In other words, there is no stated preference for “patient” 
investors and no rules in place for regulating investor conduct.  The 
communication addressed to investors is intended to give them a lay 
of the impact investing land in a way that makes this new market 
seem familiar and investable, and to build investor trust in the 
platform.  This may be because the SSX is an information portal, and 
actual transactions take place on whatever CSE the business is listed 
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on, so that there is little SSX could do to regulate investors’ conduct, 
even if it wanted to.  But since CSEs do not regulate the social 
dimension of investor conduct, SSX would not be stepping on CSEs’ 
regulatory toes by developing guidelines for investor conduct.  
 
 5.1.6.  Preliminary assessment 
 
Because SSX operates as an informational rather than a 
transactional platform, and because all SSX listed entities are 
publicly traded on CSEs, this exchange is well positioned to support 
the project of mainstreaming social finance.  SSX can draw investors 
into the social finance space by presenting them with opportunities 
that are attractive because, at least in principle, impact investments 
comprise an asset class which require neither big financial nor big 
social “sacrifices.”   
However, SSX does not appear to make the most of its regulatory 
power when it comes to defining the content of social corporate 
governance as opposed to conventional corporate governance.  
Indeed, SSX requires only that listed entities comply with the 
standards set for conventional businesses by CSEs (and the U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code).  This is problematic not only because 
it represents a missed opportunity to differentiate the social from the 
conventional space, but also because it could place or keep under-
equipped directors at the helm of businesses that promise to 
produce positive social impact.  Other than the impact reports, for 
which the standard of review is somewhat unclear, there seems to 
be only limited regulation of SSX listed entities.  This finding is 
reinforced by the fact that the conditions for de-listing a company 
are defined only in vague terms.   
There may also be issues related to transaction costs resulting 
from a dearth of comparable data points for evaluating investment 
opportunities.  This matters for investors, but also for listed 
businesses, because the latter receive little guidance on how to 
report on their social performance beyond broad themes, which 
means that they may lack tools to assess or increase their 
comparative advantage.  At the same time, the prose focus in the 
reports could, if properly developed and guided, more accurately 
capture beneficiary experiences, which in turn could paint a more 
complete picture of the impact actually created.  Finally, this SSE 
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offers little by way of models for regulating investor conduct to be 
more patient rather than conventionally short-termist.  Overall, and 
again this is only a preliminary assessment, SSX has a relatively 
weak framework for committing issuers and investors to the social 
missions or for holding them to account should they depart from it. 
 
5.2.  The Social Venture Connection (SVX), Canada 
 
5.2.1.  The mission  
 
SVX was launched in September 2013 with support from, among 
others, TMX group (the operator of the Ontario Stock Exchange), the 
Government of Ontario, the law firm, Torys LLP, KPMG, the Royal 
Bank of Canada, and three charitable foundations, including the 
Rockefeller Foundation.194  Its mission is to create a “market for 
good” in the form of “a local, impact-first platform connecting 
impact ventures, funds, and investors in order to catalyze new debt 
and equity investment capital for local ventures that have 
demonstrable social and/or environmental impact.” 195  By creating 
a venue for investors and businesses to meet, SVX seeks to “mobilize 
money toward impact ventures that are reducing poverty, creating 
opportunities and advancing environmental sustainability.”196  
SVX was developed by the MaRS Center for Impact Investing, 
which was formed in Toronto in late 2011 to “mobilize private 
capital for public good.”197  As MaRS’s leading initiative, SVX creates 
a “space that allows investors to place their capital in enterprises 
that can make money and do good, and that allows high-impact 
organizations to find the capital they need to help them grow.”198  
The long-term aim of SVX is to standardize the local social finance 
                                                     
194 About, SVX, https://svx.ca/en/about (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
195 ADAM SPENCE & TRISTINA SINOPOLI, SVX: Invest for impact: Case Study, 3 (Sept. 
2013), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.production/cms/files/files/ 
000/000/007/MaRS_SVX_Case_Study-original.pdf [hereinafter SVX CASE STUDY].   
196 Id. at 5. 
197 About the Centre, MARS CENTRE FOR IMPACT INVESTING, 
http://impactinvesting.marsdd.com/the-centre/about-the-centre/ (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015). 
198 SVX CASE STUDY, supra note 195, at 5. 
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space by creating “a fully regulated market with access for retail 
investors that could parallel or be integrated into mainstream 
markets.”199 
 
5.2.2.  Trading and official regulation 
 
Like the London SSX, SVX is not a true stock exchange.  It is “a 
private investment platform built to connect impact ventures, funds 
and investors.”200  This means that, although SVX aims one day to 
be an exchange that is open to the public, as of now, only accredited 
investors (who meet certain net worth or income benchmarks) can 
transact on the platform.  In other words, the securities issued on 
SVX are not public and there is no secondary market for them.  So 
far, SVX has 34 Ontario-based listed issuers and its founders are 
exploring possibilities for bringing on additional issuers from other 
parts of Canada.201  As mentioned earlier, SVX is also in the process 
of replicating its model in the U.S. (in California) and in Mexico.202  
SVX is the first online portal registered with a securities regulator in 
Canada and the first impact-investing portal registered in North 
America.203  It is registered as a restricted dealer with the Ontario 
Securities Commission (OSC) and “adheres to all relevant and 
applicable securities legislation as prescribed by the OSC,”204 
although the FAQs section of the website clarifies that “[n]o 
regulatory authority has approved or expressed an opinion about 
the securities offered on the SVX.”205  
Listed entities include a solar energy cooperative, a company 
that manufactures footwear in Ethiopia for sale worldwide, another 
that sells refurbished telecommunications equipment, a game 
                                                     
199 Id. at 3. 
200 SVX Invest for impact, Issuer Manual 2, available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/files/files/000/000/173/SV
X_Issuer_       Manual-original.pdf [hereinafter SVX ISSUER  MANUAL]. 
201 Adam Spence, SVX:  From Launch to Getting Deals Done, SOCIAL FINANCE 
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://socialfinance.ca/2014/03/18/svx-from-launch-getting-
deals-done/. 
202 SVX CASE STUDY, supra note 195, at 10. 
203 Id. at 6. 
204 FAQ, SVX, https://svx.ca/en/faqs (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter 
FAQ]. 
205 Id. at SVX, Question 8. 
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developer whose games promote a progressive environmental 
agenda, a seller of equipment for organic farming operations, a 
green housing developer, and a fair trade jewelry business.  As with 
SSX, businesses are assessed an annual fee to list based on their 
revenues:  The fee ranges from $500 for revenues under $1 million 
to $2,500 for revenues above $10 million.206  SVX fees are lower than 
London’s but the entities it targets are smaller. 
 
5.2.3.  Regulating social businesses   
 
5.2.3.1.  Listing and governance requirements 
 
To list on SVX, entities must meet the Platform Access 
Requirements.207  SVX lists small and medium sized local for-profit 
social businesses with more than $50,000 but less than $25 million in 
revenues.208  It targets for profit businesses, non-profits, and 
cooperatives looking to raise anywhere from $100,000 to $10 million 
in investments.209  The ventures must have been incorporated in 
Ontario for at least two years and have audited financial statements 
available.210  Issuers fall into one of two categories:  Social impact 
issuers defined as “ventures that are creating opportunities and 
breaking the cycle of poverty in subsectors including affordable 
housing, employment services, food security, education, First 
Nations and new Canadians;” and environmental impact issuers, 
defined as “ventures that are building environmental sustainability 
in subsectors including renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, 
consumer products, water, waste reduction and transportation.”211 
In order to be listed, for-profit businesses must obtain a 
satisfactory company rating through GIIRS, the privately 
administered rating system described in the previous Part.212  SVX, 
                                                     
206 Id. at Ventures and funds, Question 8. 
207 SVX ISSUER MANUAL, supra note 200, at 17. 
208 Id. at 17. 
209 Id. at 18. 
210 Id. at 17. 
211 SVX CASE STUDY, supra note 195, at 11. 
212 GIIRS Ratings, B ANALYTICS, http://b-analytics.net/giirs-ratings/ (last      
visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
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therefore, relies on a third party standard setter to carry out an 
important piece of the social business vetting process.213  In so doing, 
SVX is helping to mainstream the use of GIIRS in the market for 
social impact.  As discussed, while there are complications with 
using tools like GIIRS and IRIS to measure social impact, having 
access to data points, like star and percentage-based scores, makes 
it easier and cheaper for investors to compare different investment 
opportunities.  Transaction costs may be reduced by only a small 
margin, however, as SVX cautions that it “cannot confirm the 
accuracy or completeness of this information” and strongly 
encourages investors to “conduct their own thorough due 
diligence” before making investment decisions.214  Further, while 
metrics facilitate investor decision-making, those who are serious 
about impact may incur additional costs to verify impact claims and 
supplement quantitative with qualitative performance assessments. 
As concerns corporate governance, the Access Requirements 
make brief mention of board composition:  To be admitted, 
businesses must submit “[e]vidence of relevant expertise within 
management/officers and directors.”215  This suggests that SVX may 
expect more of business heads than simply financial competence.  
However, this is at most a vague nod in the direction of social 
governance, and does not go far enough.  Like SSX, SVX appears to 
be missing a regulatory opportunity to ensure that social businesses 
are run in a way that maximizes the pursuit of, and compliance with, 
the social mission. 
 
5.2.3.2.  Disclosure and reporting requirements 
 
Entities wishing to list on SVX must agree to the SVX Issuer 
Agreement, which is contained in the SVX Issuer Manual, and 
includes a number of substantive requirements.216  For example, 
issuers must file GIIRS-issued proof of rating and proof of updated 
ratings.217  Once capital is raised, issuers must report on how it is 
spent and on “the impact achieved as a result of such use of 
                                                     
213 SVX ISSUER MANUAL, supra note 200, at 15, 18. 
214 FAQ, supra note 204. 
215 SVX ISSUER MANUAL, supra note 200, at 17. 
216 Id. at 17-18, 32-34. 
217 Id. at 32. 
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capital.”218  One problem with this framework is that it is not clear 
from the Issuer Agreement how often listed entities must provide 
updated ratings.  Since GIIRS ratings have to be updated every two 
years to remain valid, it seems safe to assume that the same schedule 
would apply for SVX’s purposes.  This should be clarified, however, 
as investors likely want assurance that they will not need to seek out 
updated information on their own.  Issuers are required to make 
financial statements available annually and to prepare them using 
generally accepted accounting methods.219  They must also comply 
with applicable securities legislation and must not post any 
information that is considered misleading.220   
Thus, while traditional financial investor protections are in place 
with SVX, it is less clear how well investors—and other 
stakeholders, such as competing issuers and beneficiaries—are 
protected against misinformation concerning issuers’ social 
performance.  
 
 5.2.4.  Enforcement mechanisms 
 
Issuers are liable if they breach the Issuer Agreement.  The 
Agreement requires prospective issuers to acknowledge “that a 
breach or threatened breach . . . will result in SVX suffering 
irreparable harm which cannot be calculated or [sic] fully or 
adequately compensated by recovery of damages alone.”221  In the 
event of a breach, “SVX shall be entitled to interim and permanent 
injunctive relief, specific performance and other equitable remedies, 
in addition to any other relief to which SVX may become entitled.”222  
In addition, the SVX Issuer Agreement also gives SVX the “right, at 
any time, to halt, or suspend access to the SVX online platform or to 
remove from the Applicant, temporarily or permanently, from the 
SVX online platform, with or without notice and with or without 
giving any reason for such action.”223   
                                                     
218 Id. 
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With SVX, issuers who breach exchange rules can face a number 
of sanctions, including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and de-
listing.  This is sharper than the SSX enforcement mechanism, which 
is limited to de-listing under the vaguely defined circumstance of a 
change to the issuer’s business model.  Though SVX appears serious 
about enforcement, the Issuer Agreement still fails to explain when 
and why this power will be deployed.  It lists many contractual 
obligations, but lacks specificity regarding what—beyond an 
(annually updated) GIIRS rating and a periodic impact report—is 
expected of issuers with regard to their social performance.  It seems 
likely that if an issuer were to abandon its social mission or 
experience a big drop in its GIIRS rating, SVX would choose to 
terminate the agreement.224  However, this is not specified and the 
grounds for de-listing, or for finding a (social or other) breach 
should be clarified.  Like SSX, SVX is under-utilizing its regulatory 
power by not defining with sufficient clarity the social commitments 
it expects of its issuers, and by not filling the gaps left open by 
conventional financial regulation with respect to identifying social, 
rather than financial breaches. 
 
 5.2.5.  Regulating investors 
 
SVX’s manual for investors is very useful for understanding how 
SVX regulates investor conduct.225  Additionally, investors are 
required to enter into an Investor Agreement.226  These documents 
contain a number of substantive obligations.  First, only accredited 
investors (as defined by the OSC), who are sophisticated enough to 
invest without a prospectus, can access SVX.  Depending on the 
sophistication of the investor, they are subject to caps on how much 
they can invest on SVX in any given year.  These restrictions go to 
investor protection.   
                                                     
224 Note that this mechanism looks a lot like the de-certification mechanism 
employed by B-Lab when a B corporation fails to achieve a minimum score on the 
Impact Assessment Survey.  Interview with B Lab staff member, supra note 72.  
225 See generally SVX, INVESTOR MANUAL, available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/files/files/000/000/178/SV
X_Investor_ Manual-original.pdf [hereinafter INVESTOR MANUAL]. 
226 SVX INVESTOR AGREEMENT, available at https://svx.ca/en/terms-of-use 
(Oct. 3, 2015).  
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Second, SVX specifically targets accredited investors who care 
about impact.  In answer to the question, “Who are the investors?”  
the SVX Investor Manual identifies “[i]mpact-first investors with a 
focus on achieving positive social and/or environmental outcomes 
with patient capital investments.”227 (emphasis added).  Indeed, SVX 
acknowledges that social ventures require “a different type of 
capital to help them grow, scale and achieve systemic impact.  They 
need impact capital:  A type of investing with the goal of achieving 
a triple bottom line of social, environmental and economic 
return.”228   
Thus, while there is no mention of mission drift in the SVX 
documents, SVX clearly wants investors and businesses to commit, 
and remain committed, to the social mission.  Investors must be 
“patient” and know from the outset that social finance returns are 
not like financial returns from conventional investments that are 
easily measurable and usually generated in the short term.  In fact, 
the SVX Investor Manual and the SVX Investor Agreement use hard 
language (in bold face) to manage investor expectations:  “Investing 
in offerings posted on SVX has significant risk including severe 
illiquidity . . . and potential volatility of the investment.  The main 
objective of these issuers is not to maximize returns to investors.  
You should invest in SVX issuers only if you are prepared not to 
receive any return on your investment and to lose your investment 
in its entirety.”229 (emphasis added).   
Like the Issuer Agreement, the SVX Investor Agreement 
includes a liability provision.  Clauses 10 and 11 give SVX the “right, 
at any time, to halt, suspend or terminate the access of the [sic] 
Investor to SVX online platform either temporarily or permanently, 
with or without notice, and with or without giving any reason for 
such action.”230  Like issuers, investors must also acknowledge that 
breaches can result in various remedies for SVX.  We can presume 
that SVX would ban an investor who applied inappropriate pressure 
on a listed entity to prioritize profit over impact or pushed the 
investee away from its mission, but clarification is needed here.  It is 
needed because if indeed investors can be banned as a result of 
committing a social breach, SVX would be introducing something 
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entirely new into the regulatory mix, marking a real departure from 
the CSE model.  Clarification is also needed because SVX, like SSX, 
does not appear to provide recourse either for investors, listed 
entities, or beneficiaries to bring complaints against each other.  
SVX uses the Investor Agreement, the Investor Manual, and the 
accredited investor restriction to regulate investors.  It also employs 
a deal cap mechanism:  The maximum deal size for a social 
business—and by extension, its investors—is limited, depending on 
the submission of know-your-client and suitability requirements.231  
The deal cap is interesting because it automatically limits the 
financial returns that investors can obtain, which in turn directs 
investor expectations toward impact rather than profit.  The cap 
should also help to regulate commercialization since it limits how 
much and how fast a social business can grow, which, in turn, 
should mitigate commercial pressures—whether coming from 
outside or within the issuer—to prioritize profit over impact.  It 
would be good to clarify how many $10 million deals a social 
business can enter into per year.  
 
 
 
 5.2.6.  Preliminary assessment 
 
With SVX, there are some questions as to both the regularity and 
the quality of the social reporting, in particular as concerns the SSE’s 
reliance on GIIRS (a proxy-based system for assessing social 
impact).  There is also a lack of clarity regarding the circumstances 
under which a social business might be de-listed, or an investor’s 
access to the platform revoked.  Nevertheless, SVX appears to be 
considerably more serious about regulating both issuers and 
investors than SSX.  
Social finance and impact investing proponents are generally 
agnostic about whether investors are impact-first or profit-first.  SVX 
is very clear that its platform is for investors who care deeply about 
advancing their investees’ social missions.  This may deter profit-
first investors, but SVX evidently prefers to attract the “right” 
investors onto its platform, even if doing so limits capital flows.  
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Indeed, judging by how it (almost aggressively) manages investor 
expectations, it is apparent that SVX does not define success in 
reference to its trading volumes alone.232  This is crucially important 
for differentiating CSEs from SSEs.  Additionally, SVX’s exclusive 
focus on small and medium sized enterprises, especially combined 
with the deal cap should go a long way toward keeping listed 
entities in mission-protecting hands that are less concerned with 
achieving large financial returns.  The SVX framework would fare 
better if social reporting requirements were more systematized, the 
elements of social breach were better defined, the justifications for 
terminating platform access were clearly articulated, corporate 
governance requirements were more deeply considered, and if there 
was a mechanism in place for the stakeholders to bring and resolve 
complaints (or compliments). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.  The Impact Exchange (IX), Mauritius  
 
5.3.1.  The mission 
 
The IX was established in 2013 and has yet to fully launch in the 
sense of listing individual social businesses whose securities can be 
bought and traded.  When launch is complete, for-profits will be able 
to sell common equity, preference shares or bonds, while non-profit 
impact entities will be able to list bonds.233  So far, it appears that the 
last piece is closest to completion with the upcoming launch of two 
new types of social impact bonds.   
                                                     
232 See Pritchard, supra note 161, at 38 (observing that “[e]xchanges live or die 
with trading volume”).  
233 Impact Exchange Board Listing Guide, IMPACT EXCHANGE, 6 (Feb. 2014),          
available at http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ 
Impact_Exchange_Listing_Guide_Feb2014_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter IX Impact 
Listing Guide]. 
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Of the three SSEs reviewed here, IX is the only one that is an 
actual public exchange.  It is billed as “the world’s first public 
trading platform dedicated to connecting Social Enterprises (SEs) 
with mission-aligned investment.”234  Thus, IX will be fully 
regulated and able to support the listing, trading, clearing and 
settlement of social business-issued securities.  This means that the 
securities issued by social businesses on IX are liquid, and can be 
resold to another investor.  That is not the case for private placement 
platforms, where investors cannot easily “exit,” as there is no 
secondary market for purchased securities.  Like “any other global 
public trading platform,” IX provides advantages such as 
“transparency, efficiency and liquidity—while also ensuring that 
the social and/or environmental mission and impact of the issuers 
are both safeguarded and showcased.”235  
IX’s mission is to serve as “the public gateway for those who 
wish to invest in sustainable change for the betterment of society 
and the environment.”236  Like any CSE, therefore, IX is focused on 
creating a fair efficient and transparent market with strong investor 
protections; unlike CSEs, the focus on bettering the world is also 
central, which requires developing strong mission and beneficiary 
protections. 
5.3.2.  Trading and official oversight 
 
The IX is a joint initiative between the Stock Exchange of 
Mauritius Ltd (SEM) and Impact Investment exchange Asia (IIX 
Singapore), based in Singapore.237  The latter incubated IX “to allow 
larger Social Enterprises to access the public capital markets while 
offering socially-minded Impact Investors the opportunity to 
efficiently and effectively direct their capital into liquid investments 
that align with their values.”238  IX seeks to commercialize entities 
that “target underserved population groups . . . as . . . customers, 
employees and/or other relevant stakeholders;” these are entities 
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that operate in Africa or the Asia Pacific region, though their 
headquarters could be anywhere.239 
The IX is operated by the SEM and is regulated by the Financial 
Services Commission of Mauritius.  The SEM, established in 1989, is 
the only exchange in Africa and operates 3 boards:  the Official 
Market, the Development and Enterprise Market, and IX.240  As with 
SVX and SSX, entities that list on the IX are subject to conventional 
securities regulation.241  However, this only matters for the financial 
dimension of impact investments and does not extend to their social 
dimension.  In other words, as with the other SSEs, IX is responsible 
for the social regulation of impact investments.  Annual revenues 
will determine the listing fees. 
As mentioned, trading was due to begin at the end of 2014, but 
as of this Writing, that has not happened.  When the Author inquired 
about the launch, she was informed that the current priority is to 
create two types of social impact bonds that will be issued on the IX:  
the Humanity Bond and the Women’s Livelihood Bond (“WLB”).242  
The former will be issued by social service organizations—primarily 
non-profit, which do not include social businesses of the type at 
issue in this article—to raise funds for programs that save lives and 
“enable service organizations to overcome the challenge of unstable, 
inconsistent cash flows while offering an attractive investment 
proposition to new investors:  One which can create a 
social/environmental impact while simultaneously generating a 
modest financial return.”243  The WLB involves issuing a $20 million 
debt product, “targeting women as the core beneficiaries.”244  A 
collective of social enterprises and MFIs will issue a WLB to “scale 
their high-impact, revenue-generating programs to empower 
women.”245  With the WLB, businesses would pool together as 
                                                     
239 FAQ, IMPACT EXCHANGE, http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/faq/ (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter IX FAQ]. 
240 IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 5. 
241 Id. at 6. 
242 Humanity Bond, ASIA IIX, http://www.asiaiix.com/humanity-bond/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
243 Jenna Liang, The Humanity Bond: A Life Saving Game Changer For All, IMPACT 
QUARTERLY (Oct. 13, 2014), http://impactquarterly.asiaiix.com/the-humanity-
bond-a-life-saving-game-changer-for-all/. 
244 The WLB Structure, ASIA IIX, http://www.asiaiix.com/womens-livelihood-
bond/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
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(last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
  
212 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:1 
 
borrowers and enter into a contract with investors to repay the loan 
at maturity, with interest paid at fixed intervals over the bond 
duration.246  A white paper on these new financial instruments is 
forthcoming, but as of this Writing, there is not enough information 
available on these instruments to assess how effective the IX will be 
in administering them. 
 
5.3.3.  Regulating social businesses  
 
5.3.3.1.  Listing and governance requirements 
 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of IX is that it introduces a 
new figure into the listing and compliance process:  Potential issuers 
must appoint an Authorized Impact Representative (“AIR”) to 
support them in the listing process and to ensure compliance with 
listing requirements.247  All AIRs must be accredited and registered 
with the SEM.   
The listing requirements break down into social and financial 
categories.  In their application package, prospective issuers must: 
(1) clearly specify that positive social or environmental impact is the 
primary reason for their existence; (2) clearly articulate the purpose 
and intent of the company in the form of a theory of change—the 
basis for demonstrating social performance; (3) commit to ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation of impact performance, using clearly 
defined impact indicators for performance assessment and 
reporting; (4) have a minimum of one year of impact reports 
prepared in accordance with IX reporting principles; (5) obtain 
certification of impact reports by an independent standards or rating 
body 12 months prior to listing.248  On the financial side, a 
prospective issuer must, among other things:  (1) demonstrate that 
it uses a market-based approach to achieve its purpose and provide 
financial returns sufficient to meet investors expectations; (2) 
publish financial statements meeting internationally accepted 
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standards for at least one year prior to listing; (3) have minimum 
market capitalization of $700, 000.249 
On corporate governance, prospective issuers must address a 
question:  “Are the key management positions filled and are there 
strategies in place to retain key employees and key customers?”250  
This appears to be the only place that references to the leadership 
skills base is referenced.  It also appears to be the only place that 
beneficiary interests are brought into the regulatory fold.  IX 
imposes no requirements on issuers to include beneficiaries or 
beneficiary representatives in their governance, nor are issuers 
required to have mechanisms for registering beneficiary feedback.  
Like SSX and SVX, IX is under-utilizing its regulatory power by not 
implementing standards, rules, or measures that concretely 
differentiate the social from the conventional financial space.  
 
5.3.3.2.  Disclosure and reporting requirements 
 
As mentioned above, issuers must comply with the securities 
laws and reporting regulations of Mauritius, the SEM, and with the 
IX Rules.  The latter govern listings, set out the requirements for 
issuers to remain listed, such as reporting and “certain aspects of 
issuer conduct,” and the minimum standards of behavior to ensure 
that market is “fair, orderly and transparent.”251  IX issuers cannot 
sell their securities on another exchange, which means that IX has 
exclusive regulatory control over its issuers.   
Issuers must provide independently verified social and financial 
reports multiple times per year.252  While financial reporting is 
standardized (using IFRS), the IX Rules do not specify what 
standards are to be used for social reporting.  This creates two 
problems.  First, it is unclear whether IX impact reports will 
incorporate beneficiary experiences and feedback.  To the extent that 
reports are metrics-heavy, they will capture only proxies for impact 
and thus fall short of conveying a full picture of beneficiaries’ 
experiences (positive or negative).  Second, as with SSX, inconsistent 
reporting standards increase the costs of investor due diligence.  
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This problem is compounded if issuers select standards that are 
easier to satisfy and make them look better to investors.   
AIRs help address this, insofar as they supervise listed entities’ 
selection of standards and verify impact reports.253  Unlike SVX and 
SSX, IX has accredited individuals on staff to verify the content of 
the impact reports, which reduces the likelihood of 
misrepresentations to investors.  Indeed, AIR assistance “is intended 
to . . . bolster investor confidence—through independent verification 
of the social and environmental impact of the issuer.”254  AIRs, 
therefore, have an important role to play.  Additionally, the integrity 
of IX depends on how thoroughly they do their job, which is 
assessed by how demanding they are about selecting quality metrics 
and standards, and how deeply they look into the experiences of 
beneficiaries when verifying reports.   
 
 5.3.4.  Enforcement mechanisms 
 
There is no information concerning the consequences of 
breaching IX Rules.  Presumably, if an entity breaches, it can be de-
listed.  If it breaches the SEM (conventional securities) rules, the 
entity can be served with a formal written letter of disapproval and 
requested to explain its actions and rectify the situation.  The SEM 
can also publish any censure, refer the company to the Financial 
Services Commission for further disciplining, and suspend or 
remove its listing.255  While these are strong mechanisms, it is 
unclear to what extent the SEM mechanisms will extend to 
incorporate breaches (social and financial) of the IX Rules and this 
should be clarified.   
As with SSX and SVX, IX provides no mechanisms for investors, 
social businesses, or beneficiaries to bring complaints against each 
other.   
 
                                                     
253 IX FAQ, supra note 239. 
254 IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 14. 
255 Regulatory Functions of the SEM, STOCK EXCHANGE OF MAURITIUS, 
http://www.stockexchangeofmauritius.com/regulatory-functions-of-the-SEM 
(last visited March 2, 2015). 
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5.3.5.  Regulating the investors 
 
The IX does not distinguish between impact-first and profit-first 
investors; rather, it “is designed to accommodate all investors, 
including retail investors.”256  In contrast to SVX, which requires 
investors to enter an Investor Agreement, IX does not have a 
mechanism for committing investors to their investees’ social 
mission.  Further, there are no investor screens or rules for 
regulating the conduct of investors on the IX platform.  The 
language in the FAQs may help to manage investor expectations of 
return:  “As with any investment, the financial return that the 
investor achieves will depend on a variety of factors including the 
financial performance of the enterprise and the availability of a 
ready buyer if the investor wishes to sell the investment.”257  In 
comparison, the SVX language is much stronger and likely more 
effective in terms of deterring the “wrong” kind of investor.   
The IX Listings Guide includes useful language concerning 
“mission protection:”  “Because monitoring of each issuer’s impact 
is built into the Listing Rules . . . , issuers are ensured that access to 
capital can be achieved without losing purpose, mission and 
integrity.  At the same time, investors are ensured that their co-
investors are like minded in their support of the issuer’s mission.”258 
(emphasis added).  As suggested by this quote, with IX, the main 
mechanism for regulating investors is self-selection; those interested 
in supporting the mission will come and others will not.  Self-
selection can fall short of protecting the promise of social finance, 
especially for IX, which is an actual trading platform.  This is because 
investors can exit their investments and sell their impact securities 
to others.  If the initial investors are not committed to the social 
mission, there is reason to be concerned that they will sell to buyers 
who are even less committed, or who care more about the securities’ 
financial value rather than their social value.  The risk of making 
social impact “liquid” through trading is that the commitment to the 
issuers’ social mission could become diluted, which, in turn, can 
create pressure to prioritize profitability over impact, to the 
detriment of beneficiaries.   
                                                     
256 IX FAQ, supra note 239. 
257 Id. 
258 IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 7. 
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5.3.6.  Preliminary assessment 
 
As an initial assessment of IX, there is a benefit to introducing 
AIRs into the regulatory sphere, as they help keep social businesses 
in check and guide them toward good reporting and business 
management practices.  However, this benefit may be undermined 
for three reasons.  First, as discussed, existing metrics and standards 
for tracking social performance, such as IRIS and GIIRS, are deficient 
because they tell only an abbreviated story about impact.  This 
problem is compounded if issuers report on “easy” metrics that 
make them look better than deserved.  Second, IX does not specify 
what reporting standards to use, which increases transaction costs 
for investors by complicating the comparison of investment 
opportunities.  Third, even if the AIR succeeds in keeping social 
businesses social, its efforts may be jeopardized by the under-
regulation of IX investors.   
Indeed, the only device employed by IX to attract the “right” 
kind of investor is self-selection, which is a relatively poor 
mechanism, particularly considering the dangers that 
commercialization creates for mission protection.  This is especially 
problematic, since IX is (or will be) a real exchange with a secondary 
market for impact securities, which will make it easier for investors 
to exit their investments—as compared with private placement 
platforms.  In the conventional finance context, liquidity is a major 
draw for investors.  However, in the social finance context, liquidity 
could diminish the integrity of investors’ commitment to the 
mission.  As rule makers for social finance, in order to protect the 
beneficiaries, SSEs must use their regulatory power to ensure that 
investor commitment to the mission is not diluted, but sustained.  It 
is unclear whether IX will be effective in serving this regulatory 
function. 
 
6.  SSE REGULATION:  PROGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
 
As demonstrated in the previous Part, the regulatory devices 
employed by SSEs—listings requirements, reporting and 
governance requirements, and enforcement mechanisms—largely 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/4
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track those of CSEs, with more or less effective social adjustments.  
In this Part, I review each device and recommend ways to make it 
more responsive to the regulatory needs of social finance and its 
beneficiaries.  At the outset, it helps to break SSE regulatory 
functions into two protective spheres, one for beneficiaries and one 
for investors.  On the one hand, SSEs are tasked with protecting the 
social mission of listed issuers, which is directly tied to protecting 
the interests of the beneficiaries who are serviced by the issuer.  On 
the other, SSEs are tasked with protecting investors who will only 
invest if they trust the market and the information they receive 
about issuers’ social and financial performance.  Both spheres are 
considered below. 
 
6.1.  The Mission 
 
In its own way, each SSE commits to achieving social welfare 
gains by establishing a regulated market for transacting in impact 
securities.  This points to a fundamental difference between SSEs 
and CSEs where social welfare is at best derivative byproduct of 
investor gains.  This difference must be captured in the mission 
statement.  SSE mission statements offer important signals to 
potential users—investors and issuers—who are deciding whether 
or not to access a particular platform.  Equally important, the 
formulation of the mission dictates the design of whatever 
framework is established to achieve it.  To make positive societal 
contributions, therefore, SSEs must place social objectives at the 
heart of their mission statement and adopt an operational design 
that best advances that mission.   
Canada’s SVX may do the best job here because it speaks of 
success not in terms of attracting investors or trading volumes but 
in terms of bettering the world.  Indeed, when it comes to defining 
success, a by-product of formulating the mission, it is imperative 
that SSEs not identify trading volumes as the main criteria.  The 
number of listed entities and the amount of capital flowing into the 
market for social impact are only proxies for SSE success.  True 
success must be assessed against the goal of improving social 
welfare.  While the tendency in the CSE context is to equate social 
welfare with increased capital flows, these variables ought to be kept 
separate in the SSE context.  Should SSEs conflate financial and 
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social gains, these vehicles for commercializing social businesses 
could become complicit in creating a perfect mission drift storm.   
Baradaran makes a similar point in the context of banking 
regulation. 259  She explains that while regulation initially directed 
banks to serve the public interest, it gradually shifted to enable 
banks to pursue profitability for its own sake.260  She recounts how 
over time, “public benefit” became synonymous with profitability 
so that today, “[t]o show a public benefit, a bank need only prove 
that the proposed activity increases efficiency and competition, 
which do favor the public tangentially, but are not direct benefits.”261  
To reverse this trend, Baradaran advocates a return to the “public 
benefit test” and recommends that regulators “develop a new 
regulatory paradigm built on a reinvigorated social contract that 
will ensure banks meet the needs of the public in years to come.”262   
SSEs are poised to invigorate the promise of social finance 
through the development and administration of new, market-
specific, rules.  To play this role effectively, however, SSEs must 
clearly formulate their own mission around a commitment to 
improve social welfare.  This requires adopting a definition of 
success that goes far beyond the CSE measure of trading volumes.  
It also requires being explicit about the protection of beneficiary 
interests, particularly against mission drift, and about creating a safe 
space for social businesses to commercialize their financing so that 
incentives to drift are minimized.  The following three core values 
should be enshrined in every SSE mission statement: A commitment 
to achieving social (and environmental) gains, the protection of 
investment-affected individuals and communities, and the creation 
of a safe and well regulated market for social impact. 
 
                                                     
259 Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.  
1293, 1310 (2014). 
260 Id. at 1341. 
261 Id. at 1341.  
262 Id. at 1342.  
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6.2.  Regulating Social Businesses 
 
6.2.1.  Listing and governance requirements 
 
While a number of countries are beginning to require some form 
of sustainability (environmental and social) reporting by publicly 
listed entities, the listing and corporate governance requirements of 
CSEs remain primarily focused on verifying the financial integrity 
of issuers.263  For SSEs, however, it is imperative to collect and 
monitor information pertaining to issuers’ social integrity, and a few 
recommendations can be made in this regard.  The first is for SSEs 
to stimulate inclusive governance by instituting requirements that 
shape issuers’ leadership.  The second recommendation, which is 
perhaps harder, is for SSEs to require that issuers have a system for 
collecting feedback from Worker and Customer Beneficiaries.  And 
the third is to bolster the listing and governance requirements that 
serve to limit the mission-diluting effects of commercialization.  
 With respect to inclusive governance, none of the SSEs impose 
adequate requirements.  Governance issues feature only 
peripherally in the listing process, through questions (not 
requirements) about the composition of the executive board.  SSEs 
should be more demanding in this regard.  Leadership constitutes 
an important source of mission protection and SSEs should use their 
regulatory power to require that executives possess beneficiary-
oriented skills and credentials to help the venture meet the 
expectations of investors and beneficiaries.  It is not enough to refer 
to existing codes of corporate governance, as SSX does, because 
these codes are tailored for conventional corporations that are far 
more concerned with financial than social performance.    
In his overview of social governance, Arena refers favorably to 
the Grameen model, which is essentially a microcredit cooperative 
where the borrowers are also the shareholders of the MFI.264  Though 
                                                     
263 See generally Global CSR Disclosure, the Harvard Initiative for Responsible 
Investment, available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/about/global-csr-disclosure-       
requirements; see generally Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities                
Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013).  
264 Arena, supra note 41, at 290;  see Henry Hansmann, THE OWNERSHIP OF 
ENTERPRISE (2000) (describing and explaining different models of corporate 
ownership, including investor-owned, producer-owned, and customer owned 
enterprises). 
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imperfect, this model has the distinct advantage that it directly 
involves those who are impacted by a social business in corporate 
governance.  Where having beneficiary shareholders is not viable, 
another option is to appoint a social director whose “role is to ensure 
that the organization remains responsive to the social 
transformation of clients and adheres to stated social goals.”265  
While the IX’s AIRs could come close to fulfilling this mission-
protecting function, it would be preferable to have someone on the 
inside who is part of the issuer’s executive team.  AIRs should 
support, not substitute, the social director.  Requiring issuers to 
appoint a social director or some equivalent as a listing requirement 
is easily within the regulatory reach of SSEs, and would enhance 
their ability to protect the interests of beneficiaries, if only indirectly.   
Furthermore, by developing the terms of reference for a social 
director, including credentials and day-to-day obligations, SSEs 
would help issuers to operationalize a broad conception of fiduciary 
duty that extends beyond shareholders to stakeholders.  In fact, SSE 
listing rules should require issuers to expressly commit to expanded 
fiduciary duties, and SSEs should help their issuers to understand 
what complying with those duties means in practice.  The IX model 
nicely illustrates how listing requirements create learning 
opportunities for issuers and how SSEs can offer guidance to help 
issuers operationalize that learning:  Yes, impose stringent mission-
protecting obligations on issuers, but also give them guidance and 
support in complying with those requirements.  
 The second recommendation concerns the solicitation of 
beneficiary feedback.  In this regard the U.K.’s SSX offers an initial 
solution by requiring prospective issuers to identify their target 
beneficiaries and to show how they involve and consult with that 
group.  Neither IX nor SVX ask issuers to demonstrate how they 
involve beneficiaries.  At a minimum, SSEs should require issuers to 
identify their beneficiaries and to have mechanisms in place for 
soliciting feedback.  If beneficiary input is not sought regularly, this 
should count against admitting the issuer to the SSE.  Ideally, SSEs 
would also set thresholds for admission based on the quality of 
beneficiary feedback; however, given the challenges involved with 
comparing this type of qualitative, non-objective, information, that 
may not be realistic.  SSEs should carry out some high level due 
diligence on applicants;  if such diligence reveals that a would-be 
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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/4
  
2015] REGULATING SOCIAL FINANCE 221 
 
issuer received negative beneficiary feedback, that should weigh 
against admitting them to the platform.      
 The third recommendation deals with using SSE regulatory 
power to limit the mission-diluting effects of commercialization.  In 
this regard, SVX introduces an easy-to-replicate listing requirement 
that doubles as a mission-protecting mechanism.  The focus on small 
and medium sized enterprises, especially when combined with the 
deal cap should significantly mitigate commercial pressures to 
prioritize growth over impact.  By regulating the pace of 
commercialization, SVX facilitates issuer compliance with—rather 
than drift from—their mission.  Such rules protect issuers, 
beneficiaries, and investors who may be reluctant to invest without 
assurance that their co-investors are comparably committed to the 
social mission.  Other SSEs should consider instituting similar issuer 
size and deal cap requirements. 
Across the board, SSEs could make better use of their regulatory 
power when it comes to dealing with changes to issuers’ investor 
base, use of assets, and ownership.  As explained, such changes can 
contribute to mission drift, particularly if newcomers have differing 
commitments to the issuer’s social mission.266  Conventional 
corporate law includes various devices for defending against 
challenges to corporate control.  For example, in the U.S., for-profit 
corporations can create classified shares of stock with different 
voting rights, institute staggered boards, and implement (or 
threaten to) a shareholder rights plan commonly referred to as a 
“poison pill.”  By and large, these mechanisms have been quite 
effective, particularly when used in combination.267  As explained 
below in the discussion on investor regulation, similar devices could 
be employed in the social business context to mitigate the risk of 
mission dilution resulting from commercialization.  
                                                     
266 See Cummings supra note 60, at 589 (cautioning that hybrids must “prevent 
neglect of the social bottom line if the company assumes new leadership . . . if 
controlling shares are acquired by someone who wants to prioritize profit- making, 
or in response to market pressures.”);  see also, Belifanti, supra note 74, at 827 
(explaining “going public represents a transition from being surrounded by a core 
base of founders, initial investors, and employees who are hopefully supportive of 
the firm’s mission and value proposition, to being surrounded by a new group of 
shareholders who may or may not support the firm’s value proposition”).  
267 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893 (2002) 
(explaining the antitakeover power of staggered boards). 
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As concerns regulating the use of social business assets and 
ownership, it is helpful to consider the U.K. model for regulating 
CICs.  The CIC Regulator imposes an asset lock to ensure that “the 
assets of the CIC (including any profits or other surpluses generated 
by its activities) are used for the benefit of the community.”268  The 
asset lock works in two main ways:  First, it places an aggregate cap 
on dividends to keep CIC earnings within the company and 
encourages the reinvestment of earnings toward benefit—rather 
than investor “extraction.”269  Second, the lock restricts transfer of 
CIC assets, principally to other CICs or asset-locked entities.270  
Following this model, SSEs could require that their issuers adopt 
asset lock and change of control restrictions to ensure that 
ownership remains in mission-safe and benefit-enhancing hands.  
To the extent that there is concern about chilling the market for 
impact through over-regulation, SSEs could also consider instituting 
patient investor incentives, as described below. 
If SSEs were to enhance listing and governance requirements to 
incorporate these suggestions, it would go a long way toward 
ensuring compliance with issuers’ missions and with the SSEs’ own 
missions.  It would also significantly increase SSEs’ ability to 
regulate in the interests of the poor, while protecting those of 
investors, so that both spheres of regulation are adequately shielded 
from the effects of broken promises. 
 
6.2.2.  Disclosure and reporting requirements 
 
To establish a fair, healthy, and trustworthy market for impact 
securities, SSEs—like CSEs before them—must devise mechanisms 
for filling information gaps to correct asymmetries between insiders 
and outsiders, and promote the standardization of social finance.  
Conventional financial disclosure and reporting requirements are 
designed to protect investors and blueprinting against the CSE 
model works well for that purpose.  With respect to social reporting, 
                                                     
268 OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, INFORMATION 
AND GUIDANCE NOTES, CHAPTER 6: THE ASSET LOCK 3, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/416360/14-1089-community-interest-companies-chapter-6-the-asset-lock.pdf.  
269 Id. at 6-7 (explaining that, to ensure that they do not pay out too much of 
their profits in dividends, CICs are subject to an aggregate dividend cap of 35%).  
270 Id. at 3. 
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however, the CSE blueprint is inadequate since it supports only a 
narrow welfare-enhancing mission.  If SSEs are to succeed in 
achieving ambitious social gains, they must adjust the conventional 
disclosure and reporting blueprint to protect investors and the 
beneficiaries of those investments.  This is by no means an easy task 
and SSEs face at least two challenges in carrying it out.   
First, as already discussed, the metrics and standards available 
for social reporting do not in fact capture impact, which means that 
investor decisions could be based on incomplete information and 
that initiatives which are impactful-in-fact but score poorly on 
quantitative assessments may go under-funded, to the detriment of 
beneficiaries.  Second, for those SSEs that do not specify a particular 
set of reporting standards, there is a risk that issuers will 
opportunistically select those that are easiest to satisfy, in order to 
appear more attractive to investors.  For investors serious about 
impact, these challenges increase the transaction costs of engaging 
in social finance.  
Further, because the metrics and standards for tracking social 
impact are imperfect, and because there is no universal standard for 
reporting on social performance, investors lack the tools for 
identifying “social misrepresentations.”  Indeed, it is easier to show 
that an issuer has misrepresented its financial performance—which 
is primarily about numbers—than its social performance—which is 
more subjective and considerably harder to measure.  Because of this 
fundamental difference, SSEs will no doubt struggle to protect 
investors from instances of red washing where issuers misrepresent 
their social performance.   
One initial solution could be to require issuers to report both on 
metrics and on the substantive feedback they solicit from 
beneficiaries.  Again, this is not an easy proposition to convert into 
a workable requirement, but unless a concerted effort is made to 
collect and convey beneficiary experiences, a major piece of the SSE 
informational regulation mechanism will be missing.  Without that 
piece, both the investor and the beneficiary spheres of protection are 
weakened.   
 
 6.3.  Enforcement mechanisms 
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To effectively protect both investors and beneficiaries, SSEs 
should upgrade the CSE blueprint to regulate not only issuer 
conduct, but also investor conduct.  SVX does the best job in this 
regard since it requires issuers and investors to enter into 
contractual agreements with relatively robust remedies provisions.  
It also does the best job of laying out what sanctions are available, 
including de-listing, revoking platform access, and monetary 
damages.  The SSX and IX documents say virtually nothing about 
the consequences of non-compliance with SSE rules.  
While SVX is ahead as far as outlining the sanctions for 
misconduct on the platform, none of the SSEs adequately specify 
what kinds of misconduct actually justify enforcement.  This should 
be rectified.  Enforcement is an important part of the regulatory 
toolkit, and it must have (at least a few) teeth to deter misconduct.  
Unless social obligations are clearly spelled out, it will be hard to 
know when they have been breached.   
For an issuer, a social breach could be something simple, like a 
diminished GIIRS rating.  Ideally, however, the definition of social 
breach would be versatile enough to incorporate various forms of 
mission drift, particularly if beneficiaries are at risk of being harmed 
or exploited.  For investors, a social breach would occur if they 
pressured an issuer to depart from its mission in order to increase 
profitability.  For example, an investor could push an investee to 
focus on more affluent populations so as to reduce the transaction 
costs of servicing the poor, which would leave the initial target 
population under-served, yet again.  Such pressure-dynamics are 
hard to detect, which is why a three-way accountability mechanism 
such as the one described below would be useful. 
  
6.4.  Regulating Investors 
 
The regulation of issuers and investors constitutes another 
challenging but necessary departure from the CSE blueprint.  In the 
CSE setting, investors are the principal beneficiaries of the 
regulatory framework.  In contrast, with social finance, those who 
benefit from regulation include the investors, the issuers, and 
Consumer and Worker-Beneficiaries.  Such a multiplication of 
regulatory beneficiaries requires a multiplication of the subjects of 
regulation, which must include investors.   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/4
  
2015] REGULATING SOCIAL FINANCE 225 
 
Regulating investors is particularly important for an SSE like IX 
that promises liquidity and the freedom to exit investments.  
Liquidity or ease of exit can be problematic for a couple of reasons.  
First, it encourages short-termism, whereby long-term opportunities 
are sacrificed to meet short-term expectations of return.271  Short-
termism can be dangerous in any context,272 but particularly in 
impact investing where social gains can take longer to materialize 
than financial returns—or losses.  Indeed, as the SVX documents 
indicate, financial returns may be disappointing for indefinite 
periods of time.  Should investors fail to grasp the special-ness of 
this space and exit too quickly, they could drive down the value of 
securities and jeopardize the missions of the issuers and of the SSE.  
Second, investors who trade in liquid impact securities could vary 
in their social commitment and some may pressure issuers to 
prioritize profitability over impact, to the detriment of beneficiaries.  
For these reasons, it is important that SSE investors be truly patient 
and harbor different expectations of short-term returns than their 
CSE counterparts.  
One way for SSEs to regulate investors is through the 
administration of an investor screen designed to ensure that 
investors seeking platform access are true impact investors.  The 
SVX Investor Agreement requires that investors acknowledge the 
possibility that their investments will yield no financial return.  
Especially when combined with the deal cap, the Investor 
Agreement serves to manage investor expectations and deter profit-
first investors from accessing the platform.  We can think of the SVX 
mechanism as a self-selection screen that investors can use to decide 
if the platform suits their needs.  While self-selection is a powerful 
screening device, it would be preferable to have a screen that is 
administered by the SSE to ensure that access to the market for social 
impact is granted only to patient investors.  Where self-selection is 
                                                     
271 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 3-4 (2012) 
(challenging shareholder primacy as an ideology—not a law—that requires 
directors of public corporations to maximize shareholder wealth rather than 
prioritize long term goals like “growing the firm, creating quality products, 
protecting employees, and serving the public interest”).  
272 In the conventional finance context, proposals for a transactions tax or a 
Tobin Tax are directed at this issue, see Q&A: What Is the Tobin Tax on Financial 
Trading, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-15552412. 
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the only tool for regulating investors, as is the case with IX, the 
beneficiary sphere of SSE regulation may be under-protected.   
Self-selection should therefore be supplemented with other 
devices, such as an investor agreement similar to the one employed 
by SVX, or a “Patient Investor Code of Conduct” to which investors 
would subscribe before being granted admission to the platform.  
The Code, a type of soft law, would explain what it means to be a 
patient investor, includes a list of dos and don’ts to guide behavior, 
as well as substantive commitments.  For example, signatories could 
commit to holding investments for a minimum period of time, e.g. 
three years, and selling impact securities only to other screened 
investors or Code signatories.  They could further commit to 
prioritizing impact expansion over profit extraction, which would 
allow/encourage investees to reinvest profits into their programs 
and lower investor expectations of receiving high dividends or 
interest on debt instruments.   
Such (soft) commitments would combine to create an asset-lock 
mechanism similar to the U.K.’s, but this time focused on investors 
rather than issuer businesses.  The Code, fleshed out with principles 
and commitments, would further serve to identify the type of 
investor conduct that constitutes a social breach, which would 
bolster SSE enforcement mechanisms, as recommended above.  
Rather than each SSE having its own code, it might be preferable for 
an industry player like the GIIN to develop a single Patient Investor 
Code of Conduct and to require that investors subscribe to it as a 
condition for GIIN membership.  SSEs could then simply add GIIN 
membership to their individual investor screens.     
In preparing the Code, drafters could consult the U.K. 
Stewardship Code, which applies to signatory institutional 
investors in publicly traded companies on a “comply or explain” 
basis.273  That document contains seven principles designed to 
“protect and enhance the value that accrues to the ultimate 
beneficiary.”274  Signatory investors (1) publicly disclose their policy 
on how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities; (2) 
have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to 
stewardship which should be publicly disclosed; (3) monitor their 
                                                     
273 See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE 6-10 (2012), 
http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/ 
UK- Stewardship-Code-September-2012.aspx (detailing the guiding principles 
overseeing investor stewardship). 
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investee companies; (4) establish clear guidelines on when and how 
they will escalate their stewardship activities; (5) be willing to act 
collectively with other investors when appropriate; (6) have a clear 
policy and disclosure of voting activity; and (7) report periodically 
on their stewardship and voting activities.275  For SSEs, Principles 
(2), (3), and (4) are the most relevant because they invite investors to 
actively participate in the pursuit of their investee’s mission, while 
committing them to refrain from engaging in self-serving conduct.   
An important adjustment to the Stewardship Code for social 
finance purposes would involve expanding the definition of 
“ultimate beneficiary” to include not only the investor’s clients 
(those on whose behalf investors allocate capital) but also Worker 
and Customer-Beneficiaries.  With this fundamental adjustment, 
much of what is contained in the U.K. Stewardship Code could be 
usefully incorporated into a Patient Investor Code of Conduct.  Since 
investors in the social finance space are heterogeneous in terms of 
their size, mission, and complexity, the “comply or explain” 
principle should apply in the SSE context as well, so as to allow 
investors (justified) latitude in observing some principles more than 
others.    
 Having a code would serve not only to regulate investor 
conduct but also, as Belifanti puts it, to “cultivate” investors to 
provide the type of capital that issuers and co-investors want to see 
circulating within the market for social impact.  Belifanti explains 
that the aim of “[c]ultivation is to identify, attract, and cultivate a 
core of committed . . . stewards who understand the firm’s purpose 
and value proposition”276  The underlying notion is that where 
investors collaborate with investees to advance the mission, the 
opportunities for disruptive conflicts of interest and managerial 
maneuverings are lessened.   
She proposes several tools for incentivizing cultivation:  
Businesses could issue what she calls “MY Shares or Mission-Yield 
shares,” that give greater voting rights to stewards; they could also 
issue time-weighted dividends that increase in proportion to the 
length of a steward’s investment; or “mission-weighted” dividends 
that depend not on the duration but the quality of the investment; 
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issuers could also set up a stewards “rewards” program and points 
could be applied toward the purchase of additional shares or firm 
products and services.277  Such investor benefits could incentivize 
good stewardship and offset some of the costs of being regulated.  
For those investors who behave in opposition to their investee’s 
mission, Belifanti suggests “de-cultivation” tools, such as share 
buybacks and going private.278  While these (de)cultivation tools 
would be put to use by issuers, not SSEs, the latter could encourage 
listed entities to adopt them as part of their corporate governance.    
 
6.5.  Grievance Mechanisms  
 
A key ingredient for CSE success is investor trust.  This is equally 
important in the SSE context, though with yet another social 
adjustment:  The SSE marketplace must be trusted not only by 
investors, but also by the issuers, who should be “matched” with 
investors whose values and priorities align with their own.  SSEs 
have a big part to play in creating healthy matches and making sure 
that everyone is on the same hybridity plane.  Should matches that 
start out right become wrong, issuers and investors should have 
access to recourse.   
In the CSE context, investors are able to register complaints 
about inappropriate issuer conduct.  They should be able to do this 
in the SSE context as well.  Additionally, SSE issuers should be able 
to register complaints concerning inappropriate investor conduct—
perhaps consulting the above mentioned Patient Investor Code of 
Conduct.  Having the opportunity to air complaints about the 
investor/ee relationship through an SSE administered grievance 
mechanism could be hugely beneficial for keeping interests aligned 
within this delicate hybrid space and for trust building generally.279  
Ideally, beneficiaries would also be able to register complaints about 
social businesses.  The multiplicity of regulatory beneficiaries 
fundamentally distinguishes conventional from social finance 
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regulation, and grievance mechanisms could be important for 
accommodating this difference.  In setting up such a mechanism, 
SSEs could consider the model of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, 
which allows individuals (in groups of two or more) who have been 
negatively affected by Bank projects to bring their claims to an 
independent panel for review.280  Though it may be too challenging 
this early in SSEs’ lives to establish a grievance mechanism for 
beneficiaries, it is something to aspire to down the line.  For now, 
the recommended adjustments to the listing and governance 
requirements should help create some degree of three-way 
accountability.   
The adjustments to the CSE blueprint recommended in this Part 
may be viewed as onerous to conventional investors.  However, this 
is likely not the case for those impact investors who are serious 
about safeguarding investee missions and achieving social welfare 
gains.  In fact, the latter’s trust in the SSE marketplace could be 
deepened if they share express social commitments with other 
investors on the platform, and if mechanisms are put in place to 
stimulate compliance with those commitments.  In other words, 
while some may be concerned about the chilling effects of regulating 
the market for impact as recommended here, better regulation 
would ultimately advance the interests of anyone who is sincerely 
committed to realizing the potential of social finance. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Proponents of social finance see it as a vehicle for transforming 
the role of business in society and harnessing market forces to better 
meet social challenges.  Critics see it as symptomatic of a 
problematic over-reliance on markets to tackle every type of 
problem, even social problems that may be better addressed without 
expectations of return.  The concern is that by injecting the social 
provisioning system with an ROI mentality, we risk deepening, 
rather than reducing, the vulnerability of the world’s poor.  My own 
position is that the market for social impact is not yet mature enough 
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to justify adopting one view or the other categorically.  However, in 
order to ensure that the critical view does not become prophecy, 
regulatory frameworks must be upgraded to better govern the 
growth of social finance.   
As transnational rulemaking laboratories for social finance, SSEs 
are ideal vehicles for testing regulatory solutions that meet the 
specific requirements of social finance.  SSEs are not the only (or 
even the best) regulators of social finance, but they do provide a 
unique opportunity to imagine new ways of regulating in the 
interest of the poor.  It would be a shame not to make the most of 
this opportunity, especially while the market for social impact is still 
being formed.   
This article has argued that to serve as effective regulators, SSEs 
must add a beneficiary-protection mandate to the conventional 
investor-protection mandate.  They must strive to inject beneficiary 
protections into every dimension of their work including the 
mission statement, listing and corporate governance requirements, 
reporting requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.  Social 
regulations should be imposed not only on the listed businesses, but 
also on the investors who transact on these platforms, in order to 
minimize incentives to drift from the social mission.  Such 
regulatory innovations would contribute greatly to realizing the 
potential of social finance, ensuring that its promises are fulfilled, 
not undermined. 
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